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THE DISINTEGRATION OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY? A CLASSICAL LIBERAL 
RESPONSE TO A PREMATURE OBITUARY 
Richard A. Epstein* 
This Article plays off the title of Thomas Grey’s well-known article, The 
Disintegration of Property, which argued in part that the ceaseless consensual 
fragmentation and recombination of property rights revealed some inner 
incoherence of the underlying private property institutions. I take the opposite 
position and treat this supposed disintegration of private property as evidence of 
its robust nature, not only for land but for all forms of intellectual property. Low 
transaction costs facilitate the creation of efficient regimes of property rights. I 
use this framework to critique modern intellectual property rights cases that limit 
the use of injunctive relief in intellectual property cases, impose limits on the 
terms of private licenses of intellectual property, and compromise the protection 
that intellectual property receives against government confiscation.  
One common theme links these elements together. Once it is recognized that 
patents and copyrights should be subject to limited terms, it becomes possible to 
transfer most of the legal principles from the physical to the intellectual realm. 
Far from being dead, a unified system of property rights for tangible and 
intangible assets could be brought to health by intelligent legislative and judicial 
action. 
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Chicago; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution; Visiting 
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University of Chicago work-in-progress luncheon for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
A shorter version of this Article was presented at the Conference on Intellectual Property at 
George Mason Law School in the spring of 2009. I should also like to thank Melissa B. 
Berger and Jeana Bisnar, NYU Law School Class of 2010, and David Goett, NYU Law 
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INTRODUCTION 
The proper treatment of intellectual property, writ large, is the focal point 
of a high-stakes dispute that resonates both within and beyond legal circles. 
Roughly speaking, the protagonists over intellectual property fall into two 
broad camps. On the one side, there are those, like myself, who think 
intellectual property forms a coherent subset of a larger body of property law. 
Starting from this orientation, we constantly urge that the understandings of 
property law that have developed in connection with the traditional forms of 
tangible property can be carried over to intangible property even after the rise 
of modern technologies, such as the radio and the Internet. On the other side of 
the debate lie those who think that the rules of tangible property often provide 
little guidance for a sound system of intellectual property rights and should 
therefore be followed only with caution, if at all. The first side thinks that the 
law that is now in place can be improved by a sound adherence to first 
principles. Its detractors regard the system as moribund. The thesis of this 
Article is that it is too soon to write an obituary for an integrated system of 
tangible and intellectual property. 
The dispute over the proper role of tangible property goes back to ancient 
times. The present disputes over intellectual property reflect its late arrival on 
the legal scene. But it would be a mistake to assume that this temporal gap 
prevents the unification of the two systems, each of which arose in a timely 
fashion when needed. The Romans, for example, developed an immensely 
sophisticated system of property to deal with land and chattels, and to a lesser 
extent water.1 But the conditions of technology were such that Rome never 
 
1. For a good, though somewhat dated, overview, see BARRY NICHOLAS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW (1962). 
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developed any law of copyright. People had to pay small fortunes to get others 
to copy their manuscripts. Who needs protection against unauthorized copying, 
which is a boon to the original author? But as the costs of copying go down, the 
prospect of dissemination at a profit becomes real, and legal systems start to 
develop forms of copyright protection that echo, even if they do not precisely 
imitate, the constellation of property rights over tangible objects.  
Similar arguments are applicable to patents. In ancient times, there was no 
organized system for the accumulation and organization of knowledge. There 
were no techniques for standardization or instrumentation. In this primitive 
state of technology, patents were of little value. But once measurements are 
standardized, and manufacture is possible on a mass production basis, the legal 
protection of inventions becomes a plausible social objective, which is far 
easier to implement if it can borrow freely from the preexisting systems of 
property rights for tangible assets. It is therefore no accident that the first 
systems of patent law emerged, but only on a localized basis, in Venice in 1474 
in terms that anticipate the modern statutes in the field,2 and consistently 
expanded thereafter.3 Copyright has an even later start, dating from the mid-
1550s.4  
Historically speaking, the evolution of both patents and copyrights did 
proceed by analogy to physical objects, notwithstanding the one huge 
difference that no form of intellectual property can be reduced to possession. 
That point is surely important given that the possession of a tangible thing 
makes it relatively easy for the individual owner (who is usually, but not 
always, in possession) to use self-help to defend what he owns. Yet a regime 
that relies solely on self-help to protect tangible property is subject to obvious 
forms of abuse, so that it must be backed by a neutral system of state force to 
make it work. Indeed, much of the early development of land law both in 
Roman and common law systems revolved about the ability of individuals to 
resort to the legal system to recover land, chattels, or animals that had been 
taken from them by force.5 The use of physical possession is not, of course, 
 
2. See, e.g., Giulio Mandich, Venetian Patents (1450-1550), 30 J. PAT. OFF. SOC‟Y 166 
(1948). The operative provision commands that “every person who shall build any new and 
ingenious device in this City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, shall give notice 
of it to the office of our General Welfare Board when it has been reduced to perfection so 
that it can be used and operated.” Id. at 177. The text of the Venetian law is reproduced in 
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 106 (3d ed. 2003). The statute thus anticipates the novelty, non-
obvious, and utility requirements of the modern law.  
3. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 2, at 105-11 for more on the early history. 
4. Id. at 320-22. 
5. For the evolution of the English system of protection, see FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, 
THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW (1936); for the Roman system, see NICHOLAS, 
supra note 1, at 98-157. 
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possible with intellectual property, which leads many modern writers to regard 
it as sui generis. They stress the limited value of analogies to the older bodies 
of law, given that information has two attributes that are not present with 
physical property: “non-rivalrous competition” and “non-excludability.”6  
This claim of separation is overstated. There is, of course, no question that 
these last two elements must be taken into account in fashioning a complete 
account of intellectual property. But the inability of an owner to take physical 
possession of what he owns does not make it impossible for one person to have 
rights of exclusive use and disposition of the property in question. It only 
means that a legal system has to become more mature before it can handle the 
greater administrative burdens. In my view, the general heritage of tangible 
property cannot be disregarded because of the evident differences in the two 
systems of property rights.  
As I hope to show here, I believe that huge returns lie from systematizing 
intellectual property by analogy and extension to successful legal regimes 
elsewhere. By following rules of proven worth in other areas, each new 
articulation of property rights need not be a voyage into the unknown. Instead, 
it can avoid the pitfalls for new forms of property rights by incorporating the 
salient features of established regimes. That incorporation cannot be slavish, 
however, because the information that lies at the core of intellectual property 
exhibits characteristics that are not shared by physical assets. A physical asset 
can be retained or given away, in whole or in part. But information can be both 
retained and given away at the same time. Any agreement, for example, 
whereby a trade secret is shared pursuant to a confidentiality agreement 
involves the simultaneous transmission and retention of information—but only 
if the contractual arrangements are given strong protection, as they typically 
are.7 Similarly, the publication of information about a new invention or the 
creation of a literary work presents the same advantages. The owner of the 
work can realize gain from its publication to the world without forfeiting legal 
protection for the invention.  
In all these regimes, exclusion takes on a different coloration than it does 
 
6. Dugie Standeford, Intellectual Property Regime Stifles Science and Innovation, 
Nobel Laureates Say, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, July 7, 2008, http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=1129 (reporting on the lecture given by Joseph Stiglitz on 
July 5, 2008 entitled Who Owns Science?): 
IP is often compared to physical property rights but knowledge is fundamentally different, 
Stiglitz said. It is a public good with two attributes—“non-rivalrous competition” and non-
excludability—meaning it is difficult to prevent others from enjoying its benefits. That runs 
counter to IP regimes, which are worse than exclusion because they create monopoly power 
over knowledge that is often abused, he said. 
7. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 177 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (noting that wide dissemination of trade secrets under confidentiality agreements 
is necessary for their efficient exploitation). 
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with real property, but it still seeks to maximize the gains from both the 
creation and dissemination of protected information. Figuring out how to trade 
off exclusive ownership that gives strong incentives for commercialization 
against the free but uncoordinated use of information left in the public domain 
offers the single greatest challenge to preserving the health of the law of 
copyrights and patents.8 As I shall argue, the single adoption of one adjustment, 
and one adjustment only, goes a very long way to ease the transformation from 
tangible to intangible property. Just use limited terms of exclusive rights, 
longer for copyrights than patents, to work the transformation from tangible 
property to these two vital forms of intellectual property. At that point, the 
remainder of the rules that deal with tangible property, namely those that 
concern exclusion, use, and disposition, can be carried over without difficulty. 
The same can be said about the limitations that are imposed on a system of real 
property, including those that deal with special privileges—think of the law of 
private and public necessity—that allow one person to use the property of 
another, and the antitrust limitations that restrict the ability of any holder of 
tangible property to coordinate its actions with others or to engage in unilateral 
practices that monopolize a given market.9 
I have little doubt that this model captures much of the historical evolution 
of property rights, in both writings and inventions, as a conscious extension of 
the classical liberal conception of property that is associated with such writers 
as John Locke,10 William Blackstone,11 and Adam Smith.12 Just for the record, 
it is important to quote the single (though misleading) sentence of Blackstone 
that is commonly thought to capture this world view. Property refers to “that 
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external 
things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the 
universe.”13 
 
8. For the consistent championship of this view, see F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights 
and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697 (2000); F. Scott 
Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the Periphery of Intellectual Property, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174 (2004). 
9. See, e.g., The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2006). For my discussion of the 
connection between section 1, that deals with cooperative arrangements among parties on the 
same side of the market, and section 2, that deals with unilateral practices of a single firm, 
see Richard A. Epstein, Monopolization Follies: The Dangers of Structural Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 205 (2009). 
10. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett 
Publishing Co. 1980) (1690). 
11. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1765). 
12. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner eds., 
Liberty Classics 1981) (1776). 
13. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *2. 
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Few people actually read this excerpt in its immediate textual context, 
which shows that Blackstone was well aware of the functional justifications for 
property rights, even within his natural rights framework.14 This additional 
material explains that the defense of ownership cannot depend on receiving it 
from a prior purchaser, because that only pushes the ultimate inquiry back one 
step. How does the initial purchaser acquire the property in question? If by 
purchase, then the mystery is put back yet one more step. If not, then the 
alternative justification for private property has to be articulated and explained.  
On this critical question, Blackstone was no natural law fetishist, as he 
immediately turns to examine the two rival theories of the acquisition of 
original ownership.15 The first of these, which dates back to Roman times,16 is 
the theory of occupancy whereby the first possessor of property becomes its 
owner, without the consent of any other person, given the relationship between 
the person and the thing. The second theory finds that the universal (if implied) 
consent of all other individuals justifies the institution in libertarian terms. Both 
of these theories have their weaknesses. The former does not explain why other 
individuals are so bound by the unilateral action of the first possessor. The 
second uses implied consent as a deus ex machina that ignores the serious 
holdout problems that would arise if actual consent were required. Blackstone 
was not able to resolve the perceived conflict between these two theories, given 
the inadequacy of both,17 so he diplomatically moves on to other questions, 
trusting the reader to choose between them. 
There is, however, a better way to make his case. In particular, two clues 
are found in these famous passages. The first is found in Locke‟s observation 
that “[i]f such [i.e. universal] consent as that was necessary, man had starved, 
notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.”18 The second is found in 
Blackstone‟s pithy observation “[n]ecessity begat property.”19 This last 
reference to necessity hammers home the holdout point to which Locke alludes. 
That necessity conception, moreover, should be taken quite literally to indicate 
 
14. The full passage reads: 
There is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of 
mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims 
and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other 
individual in the universe. And yet there are very few, that will give themselves the trouble to 
consider the original and foundation of this right. . . . But, when law is to be considered not 
only as matter of practice, but also as a rational science, it cannot be improper or useless to 
examine more deeply the rudiments and grounds of these positive constitutions of society. 
Id. 
15. Id. at *8-*9. 
16. See G. INST. 2.66 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans.); J. INST. 2.1.30. 
17. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *8. 
18. LOCKE, supra note 10, § 28. 
19. 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *8. 
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that the judgment that one individual should be able to bind the rest of the 
world with respect to a given piece of land must be set in a larger context where 
all individuals are entitled to do the same. The privatization of property cannot 
be done by universal consent in light of the formidable transaction costs that 
block the way. But the overall social utility of the institution, which Blackstone 
so eloquently defended, justifies this limitation on the natural liberty of all 
individuals to move about as they see fit, backed by the power of the state to 
justify the origin of the institution on what are overtly consequentialist 
grounds.20 The social gains from the increased production of land are shared 
widely across the population.  
The rules that Blackstone imperfectly defended have come under constant 
attack by modern theorists who, writing in a pessimistic tone, think that some 
richer and deeper account is needed to justify the institution of property in the 
modern world.21 Their skepticism carries over to the law of intellectual 
property. Once the discussion shifts to intellectual property, every author whom 
I shall criticize in this Article—Thomas Grey,22 Margaret Radin,23 and Peter 
Menell24—bases his or her critique of the modern law on a two-pronged attack 
on the soundness or adequacy of the classical liberal conception of property 
rights embodied in Blackstone‟s famous definition, usually by focusing on my 
writings.25 The first prong of the attack seeks to undermine the basic coherence 
of the classical liberal approach to property rights in its own home court, as it 
were, of land and chattels. The second disputes the ability to extend insights 
about tangible property to intellectual property, especially, but not solely, for 
patents and copyrights. Both of these disputes arise in two related contexts. The 
first of these involves the private disputes that take place between ordinary 
individuals. The second involves the ability of the government to either take (in 
 
20. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Richard A. Epstein, Liberty Versus 
Property?: Cracks in the Foundations of Property Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 15-19 
(2005). 
21. See, e.g., LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 24 
(1977); RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 130-31 (1951); 
Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 15-16 (1927). I have long 
been a stout defender of the first possession principle. See Richard A. Epstein, Possession as 
the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979). 
22. Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII: 
YEARBOOK OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 69 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
23. Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the 
Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1667-69 (1988). 
24. Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace of Intellectual 
Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 720-21 (2007). 
25. Grey does so elsewhere, with gusto. See Thomas C. Grey, The Malthusian 
Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21 (1986). 
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the sense of occupy and use) property, on the one hand, or to regulate its use 
and disposition on the other.  
On both these issues, I think that the multiple critics have pronounced a 
premature obituary for the integration thesis. The basic principles of property 
law are alive and well, and they are capable of reasonable extension to all 
forms of intellectual property. To make good this claim that property law is 
now in good shape, I conduct the overall analysis on a simple two-by-two grid. 
On one axis lie physical and intellectual property; on the other lie private and 
constitutional disputes. I think that most of the mischief in both the public and 
private law has its origins in these two attacks on the classical liberal approach. 
The purpose of this Article is to explain why that approach remains superior to 
its modern substitutes, notwithstanding the undoubted vehemence of the critics. 
Accordingly, Part I deals with the attack on traditional conceptions of property 
with respect to tangible assets. Part II then carries the analysis over to 
intellectual property. The similarity of the issues that are raised in the two 
contexts offers, I believe, ample evidence that the carryovers and analogies are 
not only desirable, but also unavoidable.  
I. THE COHERENCE OF TANGIBLE PROPERTY  
A. Grey’s Disintegration  
The title of this essay makes conscious reference to Thomas Grey‟s 
influential 1980 article, The Disintegration of Property, the title of which offers 
a pithy summary of its basic theme. Grey‟s claim is that in the modern 
capitalist age, the notion of property has become so encrusted with barnacles 
that it offers little guidance to the major policy choices of the present day. “It 
seems fair to conclude,” he writes, “from a glance at the range of current usages 
that the specialists who design and manipulate the legal structures of the 
advanced capitalist economies could easily do without using the term 
„property‟ at all.”26  
There is no uncertainty as to what conception of property falls in Grey‟s 
crosshairs. Right after the quoted sentence, Grey takes aim at “classical liberal 
thought” as embodied in the work of Blackstone in his Commentaries, Kant in 
his discussion in The Metaphysics of Morals, and the natural rights provisions 
that are found in many of the early American state constitutions.27 Grey‟s 
 
26. Grey, supra note 22, at 73. 
27. Id. (citing 2 BLACKSTONE, supra note 11, at *2; IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF LAW 81-84 (W. Hastie trans., Edinburgh 1887)). For an example of an early constitution 
with provisions for natural rights, see MASS. CONST. art. I, annulled by MASS. CONST. art. 
CVI (“All men are born free and equal, and have certain natural, essential, and unalienable 
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argument is consciously painted in very broad strokes, but its gloomy theme is 
that the proliferation of the different forms of property holdings places undue 
stress on the basic conception of property rights. One of his clear motives is to 
explain why the confused status of property rights helps explain the low status 
that the United States Supreme Court gives to the constitutional protection of 
property under both the Takings and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.28 In carrying out this mission, he relies on the then-
recent work of Bruce Ackerman to support the view that the modern “scientific 
definitions” of property have displaced the commonsensical, but ultimately 
unsatisfactory, view that laymen take toward private property.29 
One key challenge for this theory is to identify the set of stylized 
developments—neither Grey nor Ackerman do any close historical work—said 
to mark the demise of the classical liberal conception of property. Grey 
identifies the key shift in ordinary locution of native speakers. The traditional 
view of property spoke about the relationship of a person to a particular thing. 
In contrast, the “modern specialist” sees property as a “bundle of rights,” which 
Grey regards as a more “shadowy” conception.30  
That criticism misses the mark. The key advantage of the bundle of rights 
image is that it allows individuals to sell off bits and pieces of a thing to various 
persons. Well structured, these transactions in question can proceed with great 
rapidity and generate complex distributions of rights so that after a while it 
becomes quite difficult to give an authoritative answer to the question of who 
counts as the “owner” of any given thing subject to these divided interests. But 
that point does not matter so long as it is possible to keep track of the interests 
so created and render each party its due. This approach works well with the 
division of property into legal and equitable ownership, where the legal owner 
holds the property in trust for the equitable owner.31 And it explains how it is 
possible to carve out other property interests in land: life estates and remainder 
interests, both vested and contingent; mortgages; leases; easements and 
restrictive covenants. The division of interests in chattels is often more 
restricted, given their limited value and, in many instances, their limited 
 
rights; among which may be reckoned the right of enjoying and defending their lives and 
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; in fine, that of seeking and 
obtaining their safety and happiness.”). 
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
29. Grey, supra note 22, at 69 n.1 (citing BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE CONSTITUTION 97-100, 113-67 (1977)). My opposition to this position has been 
consistent. For my critique of Ackerman (not cited in Grey), see Richard A. Epstein, The 
Next Generation of Legal Scholarship?, 30 STAN. L. REV. 635 (1978) (reviewing 
ACKERMAN, supra). 
30. Grey, supra note 22, at 69. 
31. Id. at 69-70. 
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expected rights. Yet in all cases, so long as the division of rights sums up to the 
initial whole, the utility of the parties is improved without harming any 
outsider. 
Looking at the extensive range of divided interests is therefore an odd way 
to demonstrate the breakdown of the classical liberal system of property rights 
under the demands of modernity. Historically, the English doctrine of estates 
developed to accommodate multiple interests in a single plot of land. The 
Roman conception of ownership is commonly thought to be more absolute 
because it found no place for elaborate sets of future interests. The only 
division of beneficial ownership it allowed was between the usufruct—roughly 
an inalienable life estate in possession—and the “bare ownership,” or what we 
should call the reversion. There were no multiple life estates, contingent 
remainders or executory interests. But that law did contain an elaborate law of 
servitudes, and a nascent law of leases and mortgages, so that it would be 
incorrect to claim that the system did not permit any division of property 
interests.32  
Indeed, we can take the argument one step further. The ability to fragment 
property into multiple interests is not just a legal curiosity; it is an economic 
engine that generates new possibilities for gains from trade in the rights over a 
single asset. The obstacle to desirable fragmentation lies in the high transaction 
costs that it takes to create, record, and enforce these divided interests.33 In this 
regard, one reason to restrict the proliferation of interests in real property is 
because it complicates the ability of third persons who wish to acquire an 
interest in the asset to know the state of the title. The ability to extract gains 
from assets increases as the transaction costs of creating divided interests fall. 
The key to driving down transaction costs is the development and 
implementation of standard modes of doing business, which others can imitate 
and adopt as the case may be. Mortgages, for example, that have different 
substantive terms are hard to bundle in packages that can be resold in the 
market to diversify risk. But standard forms, when consistently used in 
originating new mortgages, allow for securitization to take place. Now assets 
can be purchased, sliced, and recombined far more easily than if each of them 
contained different sets of terms. To be sure, there are risks with this procedure, 
which include valuation risks when the elements within a given portfolio 
become too complex. And, of course, voluntary transactions in this market can 
fall prey to undesirable systems of regulation that encourage imprudent 
lending, as with the meltdown in the financial markets, owing to a toxic 
combination of easy-money policies,34 excessive subsidies for subprime 
 
32. For the various interests in real property, see NICHOLAS, supra note 1, at 98-157. 
33. See, of course, R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
34. See, e.g., JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS AND 
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mortgages,35 and unwise mark-to-market accounting rules.36  
Conceptually, the constant pressure to divide property rights into smaller 
elements means that it is no longer possible to represent private property as 
constituting one indivisible thing. It now becomes a set of interests in that one 
thing, each of which is entitled to as much protection as the whole from which 
it derives. Eric Claeys makes the instructive observation that, historically, the 
legal realists seized on the bundle of rights phraseology as a tool to weaken the 
protection that the law afforded to property rights.37 His argument is that once 
the law dumbs down property to some arbitrary assemblage of rights, it 
undermines the willingness of judges and legislators to protect it against forms 
of regulation that impose limitations on the private rights of use and 
disposition, always in, of course, the name of the public interest.  
There is good reason to doubt Claeys‟s novel claim.38 No one can seriously 
dispute the rise of state regulation over land during much of the Twentieth 
Century. But it is far more likely that the Progressives who championed this 
move had deep misgivings about the private control of the means of production 
in a capitalist system. In earlier periods, however, the phrase “bundle of rights” 
was used by the champions of private property, not its detractors. This image 
dates back to Roman law, which assigns three attributes to absolute 
ownership—possession, use, and disposition—all of which were dutifully 
carried forward into Anglo-American law.39 Without question, the 
fragmentation of property interests had been well established long before the 
“high point” of classical liberalism to which Grey refers.40 Clearly, something 
is amiss, and Grey‟s thesis fails to capture it.  
In responding to Grey‟s large claims, it is important to understand the 
 
INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PROLONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 11-14 (2009). 
35. See, e.g., id. 
36. On mark-to-market accounting, there is a vast literature. See, e.g., Franklin Allen & 
Elena Carletti, Mark-to-Market Accounting and Liquidity Pricing, 45 J. ACCT. & ECON. 358 
(2008) (noting the cascades of mark-to-market accounting); Press Release, United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Congressionally Mandated Study Says Improve, Do 
Not Suspend, Fair Value Accounting Standards (Dec. 30, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-307.htm. For my views, see Richard A. Epstein 
& M. Todd Henderson, Marking to Market: Can Accounting Rules Shake the Foundations of 
Capitalism? (Apr. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1385382. 
37. See Eric R. Claeys, Takings: An Appreciative Retrospective, 15 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 439, 447-51 (2006). 
38. For my friendly rejoinder, see Richard A. Epstein, Taking Stock of Takings: An 
Author’s Retrospective, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 407, 417-18 (2006). 
39. See, e.g., A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 113-17 
(A.G. Guest ed., 1961). 
40. Grey, supra note 22, at 73. 
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missing piece of the puzzle, which relates to the fundamental legal constraints 
that order this multiplication of interests. The first of these has to do with the 
relationship of the owner of property to the rest of the world. The classical 
liberal conception did treat rights of possession, use, and disposition as its core 
components. The right of possession was exclusive to the owner; the right of 
use was not unlimited but was bounded by the law of trespass and nuisance; 
and the right of alienation was strongly protected but was also subject to 
complex limitations, some of which made sense, and others of which did not.41 
The details of these points need not detain the reader, so long as the one 
overriding constraint remains well understood. No transfer of rights, either in 
whole or in part, should do anything to either increase or diminish the rights of 
the original owner against the rest of the world.  
The arguments in favor of this view do not rest on any arid sense of 
formalism, but reflect deeply practical concerns. Start with the risk that the 
transfer of rights could increase claims against third parties. Any ability of an 
owner to increase his rights against third persons through transfer would 
encourage pointless transactions for strategic gain. A owns land subject to a 
covenant with B against its use as a supermarket. With the covenant in place, 
the land is worth $1000 to A and only $800 to C, a prospective purchaser. Even 
if transactions costs were zero, the property would never be transferred if the 
covenant “ran” with the property, given its reduction in value in C‟s hands.42 
But now assume that for some reason, the legal system routinely allowed C to 
take the land free of the covenant that was structured to run with it. In those 
circumstances, the land is now worth $1400 to C, relative to $1000 to A. So it 
looks as though the covenant prevents a beneficial exchange. 
This analysis of the transfer from A to C ignores, however, the position of 
B, the holder of the covenant. If that covenant were worth $1000 to B, then the 
transfer reduces the total value of the system by $600, as C‟s $400 gain is 
dwarfed by B‟s $1000 loss, even if transaction costs are zero. If, contrary to 
these assumptions, the gain to C from building the grocery exceeds the losses to 
B from having it built, the right approach usually is for A to buy out the 
covenant in order to allow the subsequent transfer to C. And in some 
 
41. For a longer discussion of my view, see Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain 
Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985). 
42. For the modern synthesis, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES (2000) 
(developing a unified approach for easements and restrictive covenants). For a general 
discussion of this topic, see Susan F. French, Toward A Modern Law of Servitudes: 
Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1982) (anticipating the 
Restatement position, of which she was the Chief Reporter); William B. Stoebuck, Running 
Covenants: An Analytical Primer, 52 WASH. L. REV. 861 (1977). The reference to the 
ancient strands is to the Roman doctrines, which indeed featured a uniform approach. See G. 
INST. 2.14 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans.). 
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circumstances, condemnation for fair value might well be appropriate if the 
holdout problems become acute.43 But the one unacceptable approach is to 
allow voluntary transfers between A and C to defeat the rights of third parties. 
Just this insight, for example, lies behind the inflexible common law rule that 
assignees of contract rights take subject to all defenses that could be raised 
against the assignor.44 Otherwise, the legal system encourages useless transfers 
to defeat important defenses, such as those based on fraud in the inducement or 
the statute of limitations. The paramount economic role for this rule is so great 
that it is hard to accept any time-bound critique that finds value in the rule at 
the “high point” of classical liberalism but no value today. Property rules are 
not ephemeral. The risk of strategic behavior is a constant threat in any world 
populated with a substantial fraction of self-interested individuals—which 
means any world at all. 
The same argument holds for the reciprocal proposition about the loss of 
rights against third parties. No transfer between A and B should ever allow C to 
increase his rights against A or B. Once again, the simple economic logic on 
this position remains as powerful today as it was at the height of classical 
liberalism. It would be ruinous to voluntary transactions of interests in property 
if their sale resulted in the loss of rights against third persons. At this point, all 
gains from trade would be necessarily truncated because of the new liabilities 
imposed for the benefit of third parties.  
Here are two examples of how this could work in the context of public 
regulation. First, the Jarvis-Gann Amendment45 imposes significant caps on the 
increases in real estate taxes that can be imposed on the owner of property, but 
only so long as he or she does not sell the property.46 The rapid rise in market 
values leads therefore to a real disconnect, such that the owner who does not 
sell pays taxes keyed to inflation but not to the scarcity value of the land. 
Assume for concreteness that these taxes are $5000 per year, which capitalized 
over time, is equal, roughly speaking, to about $100,000. The alienation of the 
property results in a recalibration of the base so that the buyer has to pay a tax 
of $12,500, subject to the same protection against future increases. That works 
out, of course, to a new lien equal to 250 percent of the old one, or $250,000. 
Hence, unless the value of the property (assuming transactions costs are zero) 
in the hands of the purchaser exceeds the value in the hands of the seller by 
more than $150,000 (the $250,000 less $100,000), the transaction will not take 
place, with an overall social loss in efficiency.  
 
43. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 336 (1981). 
45. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (enacted by Proposition 13 passed in 1978). 
46. The proposition was upheld against constitutional challenge in Nordlinger v. Hahn, 
505 U.S. 1 (1992). 
 468 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:455 
 
 
To be sure, there may be many good reasons to cap the total level of real 
estate taxes to deal with the risks of big government. But Jarvis-Gann skews the 
operation of voluntary markets and thus ignores the fundamental premise that 
benefits and burdens of ownership should “ride through” to subsequent takers. 
The proper result thus ties taxation to the value of the real estate, regardless of 
who owns it, at which point the transfer neither increases nor decreases those 
obligations.  
The second example arises in the takings context. One persistent question 
is whether various land use restrictions should be allowed through regulation 
without paying compensation. For these purposes, I shall bracket the inquiry of 
how that takings question should be decided in suits brought by a single owner, 
and insist only on this proposition: the state should not be able to impose 
additional restrictions on the subsequent taker of the land just because he or she 
has notice of the regulation prior to purchase. The transfer of property interest 
never increases the power of the state relative to its claims against the original 
owner.  
Here again the basic argument is this: there is no reason to discourage 
mutually beneficial transactions by validating, without compensation, 
regulation against the buyer that could not be imposed unilaterally on the seller. 
As well stated in the early decision Tulk v. Moxhay, the ancient doctrines of 
privity of contract and privity of estate hold that the buyer stands in the shoes 
of the seller as against the world.47 That formal doctrine thus ensures that these 
transfers do not result in a loss of entitlement.  
The judicial acceptance of this position in constitutional contexts is, 
however, shaky. In the important decision of Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,48 the 
Supreme Court took the right categorical position that alienation of property—
in that case a forced distribution of a liquidated corporation to its sole 
shareholder, no less—did not increase or reduce the state‟s right to impose 
wetland regulation without compensation. That decision represents a very 
sound extension of a basic principle of private law into the public law, and 
shows, if demonstration is needed, the fundamental conceptual linkage between 
them, which also holds for intellectual property.  
 
47. See, e.g., Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143, 1144 (Ch.) (“[I]t is now 
contended, not that the vendee could violate that contract [with the restrictive covenant], but 
that he might sell the piece of land, and that the purchaser from him may violate it without 
this Court having any power to interfere. If that were so, it would be impossible for an owner 
of land to sell part of it without incurring the risk of rendering what he retains worthless. . . . 
Of course, the price would be affected by the covenant, and nothing could be more 
inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able to sell the property the next day 
for a greater price, in consideration of the assignee being allowed to escape from the liability 
which he had himself undertaken.”). 
48. 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
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Nonetheless, good outcomes do not always remain settled. Two years later, 
in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency, the Supreme Court retreated from this clear and sensible rule to a 
muddy declaration that notice of government action was one factor that a court 
could take into account in deciding whether the imposition of a regulation was 
a compensable event.49 This ostensible refinement gives us the worst of both 
worlds, as a certain and efficient rule gives way to an uncertain rule whose only 
function is to undermine gains from trade. Once again, uninformed claims of 
historical evolution should not be allowed to undermine a sound system of 
property rights. The basic proposition of classical liberal theory holds good 
across time and social circumstances. 
The second part of the picture is every bit as important as the first. Grey 
gives a negative spin to the fragmentation of property interests through 
agreement. That is the force of the term “disintegration,” as the opposite of 
integration—to make whole. It is therefore no surprise that the list of synonyms 
in the Microsoft Word Thesaurus reads as follows: “meaning, breakdown; 
synonyms, breakdown, breakup, collapse, crumbling, dissolution, 
degeneration.” Breakdown for its part leads to: “stop working, break, fail, 
collapse, go down, crash, go kaput and go wrong.” Every connotation and 
every shade of meaning is negative.  
The economics of the situation, however, reveal a very different picture 
once the second law of voluntary transfers is taken into account. All voluntary 
transactions generate gains for the parties in excess of the transaction costs to 
bring them about. Note the odd disjunction between an evaluative term, 
“disintegration,” with ominous overtones, against an economic picture of 
increasing gains shared by all parties that conveys the exact opposite view. The 
rights of all third persons are strictly preserved by transactions that generate net 
gains to the trading parties. As a first approximation, this is a situation to be 
welcome.  
The only question left, therefore is whether the preservation of rights 
(against both upward and downward movement) is consistent with the overall 
advancement of social welfare, which asks whether the subjective utility of the 
various parties increases as well. In general, this question also receives a 
positive answer. We know that voluntary transactions produce gains to all 
parties. We also know that the decline in transaction costs increases the number 
of persons to participate in transactions. And we also know that, on average, the 
increase in wealth to transacting parties will generate greater opportunities for 
trade to third persons, which enhances their welfare. Stated otherwise, the 
generation of gains produces positive externalities in the vast run of cases.  
 
49. 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
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This proposition is not universal. There are some situations, for example, 
cartelization, where the sign of the externality turns systematically negative, 
which is why a carefully delimited version of the antitrust law may well make 
sense—both for tangible and intellectual property.50 But that modification of 
the basic property rights system is consistent with the classical liberal 
conception that always showed a consistent reluctance to enforce contracts that 
might be in restraint of trade.51 It is, however, wholly misleading to take the 
great achievements of the legal system—accurate recordation, the statute of 
frauds52—as evidence that something is amiss with the property system, when 
the exact opposite is true. Unlike price control laws, for example, these 
formalities are not intended to reduce the security of transactions but to 
improve it. Any increase in the velocity of reliable and enforceable 
transactions, or in the ability to create divided interests in property, has positive 
consequences both for individual wealth and for social welfare.  
It would, for example, be a serious mistake to assume that the 
disintegration that Grey speaks about is a sign of system malaise that parallels 
the creation of the anticommons in property, both tangible and intangible.53 
The anticommons problem arises, if at all, when separate parties are not able to 
coordinate their activities, so that the actions of each operates as a blockade 
against the others. But the consensual division of rights is always structured in 
ways that facilitate, not frustrate, future levels of coordination. So long as the 
owners of each thread of a complex tapestry derives from a single owner, more 
fragmented property rights signals gains for trade, not institutional paralysis.  
 
50. See infra at pp. 129-130. 
51. See, e.g., Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 348 (Q.B.) (finding a 
covenant not to compete valid subject to limitations on duration, area, and scope of 
business). 
52. 29 Car. 2, c. 3 (1677) (Eng.). 
53. See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP 
WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008); Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. 
L. REV. 621 (1998). For its application to patents, see Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. 
Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 
SCIENCE 698 (1998). On average, I think that these concerns are overrated. See Richard A. 
Epstein & Bruce N. Kuhlik, Is There a Biomedical Anticommons?, REG., Summer 2004, at 
54; Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and Associations: Why the Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315, 334-35 (2005); see also F. Scott Kieff, On 
Coordinating Transactions in Intellectual Property: A Response to Smith’s Delineating 
Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 101, 106-08 (2007). The gist of 
the criticism of Heller and Eisenberg lies in the want of parallelism between the 
unenforceable and sub rosa entitlements doled out by bureaucrats and the binding licenses 
that IP owners create in their assets. Typically, no IP owner wants to keep a wasting asset on 
the shelf. In those cases where a patent is not exploited, the typical explanation is that the 
patentee holds substitute patents of greater commercial promise. 
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Grey‟s attack on the coherence of the property rights system is not 
confined to tangible property, but extends to other forms of property as well. 
Not surprisingly, he invokes, but does not discuss, patents and copyrights. 
Instead, in a fashion reminiscent of Charles Reich,54 his discussion focuses on 
decidedly traditional property and contract arrangements, including commercial 
paper, bank accounts, and insurance policies.55 Yet, once again, all of these 
arrangements long antedate the rise of the modern capitalist state, and at all 
times their legal uses and limitations have been well understood. Grey gives the 
instance of ordinary speak where we “deposit our money in the bank,”56 and 
cautions against thinking that we retain ownership of the discrete dollars in 
question, when what is done is to create a “set of abstract claims against an 
abstract legal institution.”57  
The argument fails. Put aside the point that there is nothing abstract about a 
bank. The difference between deposits of a specific thing to be returned and the 
deposit of a fungible, where the return obligation required only the repayment 
of a thing of like kind, is as old as the Roman Law distinction between the wide 
range of bailments (of the specific res with an obligation to return) and mutuum 
(a specialized transaction in which ownership in some fungible was passed to 
the recipient who was obligated to return something of the same kind, without 
interest, down the road).58 These arrangements started with fungible materials 
like sugar, but were quickly and easily extended to money. But rightly 
understood, they are only fully accounted for by the two principles outlined 
above. As against the world, the ownership of the thing passes to the recipient 
in the contract of mutuum, so there is no split interest as in bailment cases.59 
And for the latter, the Romans developed comprehensive rules to indicate who 
had the right to bring suit for the loss of the thing and what the obligations were 
that the holder of the right of action had toward his contracting party.60  
So it is that divided ownership in land and chattels poses challenges to any 
legal system. But Grey was wrong to assert that the parties could not figure out 
who counted as the owner in these situations. Rather, they developed rules that 
allowed any designated party to sue on behalf of all persons that had an interest 
in the thing in order to simplify transaction costs. Thus, fundamental principles 
of trust law held that an outsider was bound and entitled to deal with the 
 
54. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
55. Grey, supra note 22, at 70-76. 
56. Id. at 70. 
57. Id. 
58. See NICHOLAS, supra note 1, at 167-71. 
59. For a simple discussion of the difference, see id. 
60. On the relationship between the positive and negative interests, see G. INST. 3.203-
3.207 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans.). 
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trustee, and thus did not have to concern himself with the complex division of 
interests behind the trust, which attached to the proceeds of any sale, once the 
trustee gave good title to the third party.61 Similarly, modern practice follows 
along the same line in complex syndication that designates a lead partner that is 
in charge of relationships with the rest of the world subject to a range of pre-
specified obligations, which could require consultation with fellow partners or 
limit its scope of action without the requisite approvals of other partners.  
It is quite evident therefore that the supposed challenges to any modern 
legal system have been overcome by techniques of very old vintage. Quite 
simply, the solutions that were developed in Roman and early English periods 
are the ones that, with slight variations, are in use today. The basic rule here 
was, and remains, that the division of property into separate interests can 
produce gains from specialization. The key relationship thus asks whether the 
gains from voluntary fragmentation exceed the added transactions costs of 
running the system. As these costs decline with recordation and more modern 
tracking devices, the complexity of property interests should increase without 
violating either of our two conditions, relating to the rest of the world and 
among the parties. Once again, the flexibility of the legal system produces no 
sign of disintegration. Grey did not examine the inner workings of classical 
legal institutions either at Roman or common law before concluding the 
classical liberal conceptions of property rights have outlived their usefulness. 
Rather, an understanding of the overall situation only shows their durability. 
B. Radin’s Conceptual Severance 
Grey‟s critique of property rights on conceptual and sociological grounds 
does not stand alone in the literature. Another influential effort to pronounce a 
death sentence on traditional conceptions of property rights lines is Margaret 
Radin‟s provocative effort to whittle down the protection that the Takings 
Clause62 supplies to the common law conceptions of private property. Her 
preferred tool of interment is her intriguing but misleading notion of 
 
61. For a discussion of the trust, see Law of Property Act, 1925, c. 20, §§ 1-2 (Eng.) 
(dealing with the creation of equitable interests and protecting persons who take the legal 
title from the tenant for life in possession, even with knowledge of the equitable interests 
behind the trust). Also see Settled Land Act, 1925, c. 18, § 38 (Eng.), allowing a tenant for 
life to sell the entire fee simple; and section 110 protecting third parties who deal with the 
tenant for life in his role as trustee. These legal reforms have not been adopted in the United 
States, but even so, the creation of legal life estates in land, for example, is quite rare, 
because of the attendant inconvenience. For the proposal to adopt the English system, see C. 
Dent Bostick, Loosening the Grip of the Dead Hand: Shall We Abolish Legal Future 
Interests in Land?, 32 VAND. L. REV. 1061, 1090-95 (1977). 
62. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”).  
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“conceptual severance.”63 This term has as its implicit opposite a functional or 
economic severance. The use of the term “conceptual” is thus intended to 
discredit those, like myself, who do not draw any categorical distinction 
between physical takings, whereby the government occupies land, and 
regulatory takings, whereby the government limits the rights of owners to use 
and dispose of land, consistent, of course, with the basic common law 
restrictions on these two incidents of ownership.64 Once again the effort is to 
dismember the system, not to nurse it back to conceptual health. 
Her critique neatly resonates with Grey, who also notes with some 
uneasiness that the Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New 
York City65 resorted to “thing-like” conceptions to hold that the owner of the 
air rights over Penn Station was not entitled to compensation for the loss of 
their use.66 Clearly if the fragmentation of interest is given its due weight 
against the government, then, as Grey recognizes, the outcome of Penn Central 
“is difficult to rationalize in the terms of modern legal and economic theory.”67 
But there is no reason for surprise given that Justice Brennan (writing for the 
majority) was far more concerned with preserving state options to regulate land 
use in what he regarded as desirable ways than with developing a coherent 
theory of property rights. How he did this is worth some analysis because of the 
large role that Penn Central is assuming in intellectual property cases. 
Brennan‟s first move anticipates the Grey logic. He proclaims that the entire 
subject is so complex that no law-like proposition can govern the situation. 
Here, his target of opportunity was the account of the Takings Clause offered 
by Justice Black in Armstrong v. United States: “[T]he „Fifth Amendment‟s 
guarantee . . . [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone 
to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole.‟”68  
In the Armstrong case, that robust proposition cashed out by saying that the 
United States could not dissolve a materialman‟s lien imposed on one of its 
vessels by sailing out of state waters so that the lien would no longer attach. 
The repairs for the ship benefited the nation as a whole, not just the 
 
63. See Radin, supra note 23, at 1674-78. 
64. For the distinction, see Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419 (1982) (holding that per se liability exists only where a taking is physical). 
65. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).  
66. Grey, supra note 22, at 72. In fact, he gets it backwards. If the air rights were a 
separate thing, then compensation would have been owed for the total taking. But treating 
the parcel as a whole, Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31 & n.5, as the underlying thing, the 
air rights become a mere fraction of the whole for which compensation is not owed. 
67. Grey, supra note 22, at 72. 
68. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 
49 (1960)). 
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materialman. The effect of the government‟s maneuver was that the lienholder 
became a general creditor, entitled to just compensation, once the lien was 
invalidated. The government could not run, or sail, away from its obligations. It 
hardly matters that mortgage liens do not fit easily into the artificial dichotomy 
between physical and regulatory takings. What matters is the effort of the 
government to deflect its obligation on a single hapless party. In a case like 
Penn Central, Justice Black‟s proposition could also apply, where it cashes out 
along identical lines. Here too it does not matter that the restriction of the air 
rights does not fit easily into either the class of physical or regulatory takings. 
Rather, what is critical is that their owner is asked to sacrifice their use for the 
benefit of the public at large. It therefore should not have to bear that cost alone 
when the public at large enjoys the benefit of the increased light and open 
spaces. The unity of the basic proposition survives the difference in the 
specification of the underlying property rights. Its crisp articulation and 
decisive application is a sign of the good health of the legal system. 
In Penn Central, however, Justice Brennan opted for disintegration, not 
clarity. At no point did he attempt to identify any critical difference between air 
rights and liens, even though he knew that both constituted property interests 
that were fully protected under state law. Instead, Brennan fled to a higher level 
of abstraction by insisting that the Supreme Court had proven incapable of 
developing any “set formula” to answer the takings question, leaving the field 
open to “ad hoc” formulations69—always a sign of incurable intellectual 
weakness. The upshot is his full version of the famous Penn Central test: 
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court‟s decisions 
have identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic 
impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which 
the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, 
of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the 
governmental action. A “taking” may more readily be found when the 
interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by 
government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting 
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
70
 
No longer does the Constitution protect private property. Now it protects 
“distinct investment-backed expectations.”71 In engineering this linguistic shift, 
Justice Brennan pays no attention to the simple fact that the separation of air 
from land rights takes place by ordinary conveyance, and as such represents yet 
another useful division of property, along with leases, mortgages, and freehold 
estates in land. In so doing, he shows no respect for the proposition that the 
 
69. Id. at 124. 
70. Id. (citations omitted). 
71. Id. at 124, 127. 
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division of property interest by voluntary transaction should neither increase 
nor decrease the obligations of government, which should have to pay for the 
loss of use rights that its regulation imposed. 
This basic proposition puts a major crimp in the modernist efforts to 
denature the protection that the Takings Clause affords to private property by 
refusing to track in their constitutional analysis the permutations built in on the 
ground floor of any mature system of private property. Radin‟s notion of 
conceptual severance was introduced precisely to break the connection between 
public and private law. Her objective was to legitimate the long-line of 
Supreme Court decisions starting with Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,72 
and running through Penn Central, which have refused in most, but not quite 
all cases, to award any compensation for loss of values from restrictions on use 
in the nature of restrictive covenants.73 Hence Radin states that a “conceptual 
severance” 
consists of delineating a property interest consisting of just what the 
government action has removed from the owner, and then asserting that that 
particular whole thing has been permanently taken. Thus, this strategy 
hypothetically or conceptually “severs” from the whole bundle of rights just 
those strands that are interfered with by the regulation, and then hypothetically 
or conceptually construes those strands in the aggregate as a separate whole 
thing.
74
 
Radin adopted this approach to refute the views on takings and property 
rights that I took in my 1985 book, Takings.75 But it is worth noting that I never 
once resorted to this strategy to make my case against the Supreme Court‟s 
unwillingness to protect rights of use and disposition for parties who were 
allowed to remain in possession of land. No matter. Radin‟s larger effort was to 
attack my “naive conceptualism,”76 my “philosophical camel-swallowing”77 in 
using “literalism or semantic reductionism in constitutional interpretation.”78 
My mistake was to adopt an approach that allows courts to “mechanically 
decide” most individual cases, without engaging in any kind of “value 
inquiry”79 associated with any evolving sense of constitutional meaning. It is 
 
72. 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see Radin, supra note 23, at 1673 & n.31. 
73. The exception is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), 
which held that total deprivations that left no viable economic use were fully compensable 
under a per se rule, while lesser deprivations were compensable only under the mushy rules 
of the Penn Central decision.  
74. Radin, supra note 23, at 1676.  
75. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985). 
76. Radin, supra note 23, at 1669.  
77. Id. at 1669 n.6 (citing Grey, supra note 25, with approval). 
78. Id. at 1670. 
79. Id. 
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no surprise that she cites with approval the vehement attack that Thomas Grey 
wrote in 1986 about Takings, with the similar intention to prevent the carryover 
of a unified conception of private property from private to public law, given the 
immense limitations it imposes on the exercise of legislative power.80 
In undertaking this task, both Grey and Radin clearly recognize that mine 
is not a marginal critique of the current legal order but part of a prolonged 
campaign to dislodge it from its current high judicial perch. But my campaign 
is not in defense of legal atomism. Rather, the analysis given above reveals the 
functional explanation for my position, which is, of course, to discourage 
various forms of strategic behavior by either private parties or government in 
the takings area.  
To return to the Penn Central situation, it is descriptively incorrect to say 
that the separation of ground from air rights was done conceptually, or for that 
matter strategically, in order to make the government pay. The parties entered 
into a voluntary transaction that by design worked an actual severance of the 
two interests in accordance with state law, which was done in order to increase 
the total value of the parcel in its private hands, not to increase the odds of 
receiving compensation, or its amount, under the takings law. Put otherwise, 
the economic logic of this transaction does not depend on the decision of New 
York City to take or restrict the use of the air rights. The question of 
compensation should not turn therefore on which of these two terms, “take” or 
“restrict the use of,” better describes what New York City did. 
The factual point, however, is something of a detail, for there is every 
reason to afford full compensation for the loss of the air rights whether or not 
they had been severed from rights to the ground. In a well-functioning system, 
we do not want to either encourage or discourage transactions by improving or 
compromising the position of the owner of property. That result can only be 
achieved if compensability is resolved in the same way regardless of whether 
the air rights are retained by their original owner or conveyed to a third person. 
Under those circumstances the only transactions that will take place are those 
which are desirable from a social point of view—hardly the vision of a naive 
conceptualist.  
Herein lies the rub. Which way should the parity run? Under the Supreme 
Court law (both in 1988 when Radin wrote and today), the fundamental and 
flawed structural distinction, already alluded to, is between a physical 
 
80. See Grey, supra note 25, at 23 (“Takings belongs with the output of the 
constitutional lunatic fringe, the effusions of gold bugs, tax protestors, and gun-toting 
survivalists.”). Radin‟s contribution to that symposium volume was Margaret Jane Radin, 
The Consequences of Conceptualism, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 239 (1986). For my contributions 
to that volume, see Richard A. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 3 
(1986), and Richard A. Epstein, A Last Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 253 
(1986). 
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occupation for which compensation is owed no matter how small, and the 
regulation of use and disposition which is governed by the far more forgiving 
balancing tests of Penn Central, subject only to an exception (in ways that 
became crystal clear only in 1992 with Lucas81) for those rare takings that 
result in a total loss of economic value from the property in question. 
Unfortunately, these undefended compensation rules induce parties to 
engage in all sorts of games to increase compensation.82 The issue lurks in the 
well-known numerator/denominator problem to which Radin rightly refers.83 
That conceptual tangle is solely an artifact of the current refusal to develop a 
coherent theory for partial takings. That reintegration of property law can only 
be successfully completed if regulatory takings are treated as continuous with 
total takings. At that point, in both cases it becomes possible to defend this 
thesis: the more that the government takes, the more it pays. Unfortunately, the 
modern discontinuous conception holds precisely the opposite: the larger the 
numerator, relative to the denominator, the better the odds of receiving 
compensation under the Takings Clause. 
Why? Because the specifically tailored interest makes it easier to establish 
a claim that “the” idiosyncratic property has been completely extinguished and 
thus has no residual value, which precludes the possibility that it has some 
viable economic use. It was to forestall this maneuver that Justice Brennan held 
that the property was the entire block of land in which Penn Central had air 
rights.84 Now the retention of the building on the ground precluded a wipeout 
of the entire parcel when the air rights were taken. Given this legal framework, 
landowners have the strong incentive to opt for small units of property, ideally, 
which just cover the interests whose use is subject to regulation. And in some 
cases, they may seek, by conveyance, to create the desirable denominator. The 
state, of course, must develop rules that deny recovery whenever private 
owners attempt to game the present system.  
Radin is right to condemn that form of strategic behavior by private 
individuals, but she should have also condemned the Supreme Court rules that 
sow the intellectual confusion that makes this wasteful game-playing 
 
81. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see also supra text 
accompanying note 73. 
82. For my most recent attack on the current edifice, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
SUPREME NEGLECT: HOW TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 
(2008). 
83. For a discussion, see Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001); Richard 
A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 16-17; Frank I. 
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just 
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967). See generally John E. Fee, 
Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994).  
84. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978). 
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worthwhile. The only way to avoid this charade is to have a rule that 
compensates for the loss of use rights to the extent of that loss, whether the two 
interests are united or severed. At this point, the present owner has all the right 
social incentives: sell the property, or an interest therein, when it is worth more 
to the buyer than it is to the seller; otherwise keep it. Forget the epithets 
“conceptual,” “mechanical,” and “naive.” Ask instead what rule does a better 
job of policing the boundaries between the individual property owner and the 
state, when the proper object of both state confiscation and regulation is to 
improve overall value.  
The first step in that healing process is to make sure that the individual 
owner is not left worse off as a consequence of the government action. If he is, 
government takings can be negative sum projects, as the state does not bear the 
full cost of its action. Requiring the payment of compensation reduces the 
likelihood that the state will condemn for transient reasons. After all, there must 
be some social gains that would induce participants in the political process to 
expend funds that reflect the private losses inflicted by government actions.  
It is, however, insufficient from a social point of view just to block all 
negative sum projects. The second task therefore is to devise legal rules and 
institutions that maximize the gain from positive sum projects.
85
 In this regard, 
the key maneuver is to find some way to stabilize the surplus that is created 
from the same factional pressures that are everywhere at work in regulation 
settings. The key intuitive force behind the proportionate impact approach in 
Armstrong is that it achieves exactly that result without requiring a detailed 
investigation of the gains and losses to each party. This rule requires that all 
parties subject to the government taking (including government regulation) 
receive benefits proportionate to their invested interests. It therefore precludes 
efforts by one landowner to hold out for a disproportionate share of the total 
gains. It would be inappropriate to allow inside payments where there is no 
disproportionate impact, but critical to allow them when one party is subject to 
adverse effects that are imposed on no others. At all points the intuitive 
conception of justice tracks a sound system of social welfare. 
In the face of this strong theory, it is odd that Radin offers no functional 
justification for the current chaotic situation. Rather, she retreats to a 
“pragmatic” world-view that “essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries” should be 
used to resolve these cases in “all-things-considered intuitive weighing.”86 But 
ask these questions: will this approach reduce decision costs—no; will it add to 
predictability—no; will it force public officials to take into account all gains 
and losses in making their decisions—no, again. But Radin (like Grey) has 
 
85. For a detailed account of how this works, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING 
WITH THE STATE 98-103 (1993). 
86. Radin, supra note 23, at 1680 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124). 
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another agenda. She fears that a rigorous conceptual and functional account of 
private property will pose a mortal threat to the constitutionality of most 
progressive and New Deal legislation.87 But it is not sufficient to fear a result. 
It is critical to explain why it does not follow from the texture and structure of 
the Constitution. 
So, once again, the conclusion seems clear: two rules are sufficient to 
shape all property transactions. No voluntary transaction between two or more 
parties should either trench on the legal rights of third persons or allow third 
persons to trench on their rights. I can think of no change in social 
circumstances or technological advances that requires deviation from these 
principles. All the flexibility that is needed to deal with airplane overflights, the 
electromagnetic spectrum and, as will become clear, intellectual property can 
be accommodated by a system that allows takings for just compensation to 
complement the universe of voluntary transactions.  
The one key element to make this system work is the notion of implicit in 
kind compensation, which only means that the compensation that is tendered to 
one person could be in either cash or kind, including rights received under 
regulation.88 This principle is an effort to incorporate into the context of a 
general theory of takings law the well-cited Holmesian notion that endorses 
general rules that create an “average reciprocity of advantage.”89 Within the 
zoning system, for example, height restrictions on one parcel of land could be 
compensated for by parallel restrictions on the nearby parcels, so long as the 
value of both parcels increases in consequence of the regulation. That one 
principle allows one to take a coherent approach to the legal transformation of 
property rights that allows for the realization of genuine social improvements, 
such as overflight rights, pooling of oil and gas interests, wildlife, and, of 
course, the defense of intellectual property.90  
Clearly, this conceptual framework is strong enough to deal with changed 
circumstances. It also has the great advantage of weeding a large number of 
small claims out of the system, even though they meet the definitions of a 
prima facie taking.91 Thus, for example, the general rule announced in First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
that temporary takings were compensable unless they were involved with the 
 
87. Id. at 1682. 
88. For articulation, see EPSTEIN, supra note 75, at 195-215.  
89. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
90. For application of this principle, see EPSTEIN, supra note 82, at 58-63 (oil and gas), 
57-60 (overflights), 63-65 (wildlife), 158-62 (intellectual property).  
91. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just 
Compensation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1081 (1999) (discussing why subpoenas do not generate 
claims for compensation). 
 480 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:455 
 
 
“normal” delays in processing permits.92 That exception makes sense because 
it filters the short delays to which all landowners are subject. But at the same 
time, it affords no protection to the endless set of delays that are part and parcel 
of many land use sagas before the Supreme Court, which are not remotely 
balanced out by the smaller losses imposed on others. Thus, in the marathon 
situation in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, Chief Justice Rehnquist‟s dissent was surely correct when it 
noted that the short periods of time—typically under six months—that were 
allowed by statute for administrative delay were appropriate, even though 
marathon hearings were not.93 
Nor does this system necessarily mean that important environmental 
interests cannot be vindicated without payment of explicit compensation. Thus, 
in Tahoe-Sierra no one should dispute that the eutrophication of Lake Tahoe‟s 
pure blue waters counts as the kind of harm that the state could prevent without 
having to compensate abutting landowners. But the failure to tie the police 
power to the law of nuisance meant that local politics dominated over sound 
water management. The incumbent landowners, whose finished driveways 
contributed so much to the pollution of Lake Tahoe, were effectively 
immunized from any legal sanction, so that their past malfeasances were left 
uncorrected. Yet at the same time the onerous restrictions imposed on 
newcomers prevented the development of houses on the land, which on a per 
square foot basis are far more valuable than asphalt driveways.  
The costs of this error are severe. The misguided protection of finished 
development over future development always gives local governments no 
incentive to undo past errors when they can force the brunt of inefficient 
preservation errors on outsiders who have not yet built. Make it clear that 
existing owners are as responsible as future ones for the condition of the lake so 
that they must compensate anyone who is restricted to covering over less land 
than existing owners have, and the driveways will quickly be torn out.94 There 
is, in sum, no reason to resort to a crazy-quilt pattern of decision-making under 
the fashionable banner of pragmatism when a single coherent theory is capable 
of taking into account all relevant factors and answering all questions in a 
principled fashion. The use of terms like “conceptual severance” just conceals 
the want of a coherent theory of property rights. It still takes a theory to beat a 
theory. Grey and Radin have no theory to displace the classical liberal position 
they seek to refute. It emerges from these assaults in fine shape. 
 
92. 482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). 
93. 535 U.S. 302, 351-54 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
94. For a discussion of the various permutations of this theme, see Richard A. Epstein, 
The Ebbs and Flows in Takings Law: Reflections on the Lake Tahoe Case, 1 CATO SUP. CT. 
REV. 5 (2002). 
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II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY  
A. The Carryover Hypothesis 
 Now that the general framework on property rights has been established, 
this Part of the Article asks how its principles do, and should, influence the 
growth of intellectual property law.  
One possible response to this challenge is to conclude that copyrights and 
patents should not be recognized at all. The argument here is not as farfetched 
as it sounds. It insists that the standard moves in the property lexicon should 
apply to this area, and these do not allow for any person to obtain exclusive 
possession of either an invention or a writing, given the intangible nature of 
both. To be sure, people can have possession of a particular instantiation of an 
invention, or of a piece of stone, parchment, or paper that contains a literary 
work. And it is possible for the owner of these to use contract to secure that 
other individuals gain access to this material only on the assumption of 
confidentiality.95 Yet both of these traditional techniques, alone and in tandem, 
could not generate two of the most powerful forms of intellectual property. On 
the other hand, the protection of trademarks would face rather brighter 
prospects because the exclusive control of the mark is widely understood as a 
means to prevent the use of a mark that “is likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive.”96  
The obvious source of difficulty therefore is with patents and copyrights. 
Indeed the strongest formulation of the objection is not indifferent to the 
statutory protection afforded to patents and copyrights. Rather it regards these 
two statutory forms of property, with some evidently ad hoc features, as the 
quintessential antiproperty whose creation necessarily interferes with the basic 
rights of speech and action that all individuals enjoy in the state of nature. 
Thus, Tom Bell has written: “More pointedly, copyright and patent protection 
contradicts Locke‟s justification of property. By invoking state power, a 
copyright or patent owner can impose prior restraint, fines, imprisonment, and 
confiscation on those engaged in peaceful expression and the quiet enjoyment 
of their tangible property.”97 Oddly enough, Bell‟s position does not derive 
 
95. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
96. The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006), shows how the libertarian 
concern with fraud plays a key role in the organization of one area of intellectual property 
law.  
97. Tom W. Bell, Indelicate Imbalancing in Copyright and Patent Law, in COPY 
FIGHTS: THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 1, 4 (Adam 
Thierer & Wayne Crews eds., 2002) [hereinafter COPY FIGHTS]. In a similar vein, see Tom 
G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property 
Rights and Ideal Objects, in COPY FIGHTS, supra, at 43, 43-44. 
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from the skeptical turn of mind exhibited by Grey and Radin. Rather, he places 
such great stock in the Lockean view—that property must be acquired by 
taking a physical object that is unowned in the state of nature—that he believes 
that common law possessory rights block the state creation of property rights in 
writings and inventions.98 
I think that this ingenious libertarian attack on copyrights and patents fails 
because it operates in too narrow a conceptual framework. The only question it 
asks is whether a system of state-created property rights in writings and 
inventions is consistent with the libertarian conception of property rights, 
which gives all individuals exclusive ownership over their own persons and 
exclusive property rights in those things that they acquire by taking possession, 
or by purchase from a prior possessor. But the more comprehensive analysis 
treats the libertarian position only as the initial baseline for analysis—one that 
is far preferable to Hobbes‟ war-of-all-against-all in the state of nature.  
This case for the Lockean rules on property rights is overtly utilitarian. In 
the long run, property rights make everyone better off than they would have 
been in a world with no limits on liberty of action and, in consequence, offered 
no security in one‟s own person or possessions. The libertarian position thus is 
best understood as a Pareto improvement99 over the state of nature. But once 
we can devise legal rules that generate one improvement, it is necessary to ask 
whether it is possible to generate additional changes that can improve the 
overall situation relative to this (second) Lockean baseline.100 On this point, 
there is a strong empirical case that offering limited protection to creators 
through patents and copyrights will introduce innovation that will redound to 
the benefit of the outsiders in the long run. This strategy concedes the 
impairment of Lockean rights, only to insist that the transformation is justified 
because all persons are left better off in a regime that creates patents and 
copyrights. Stated otherwise, the benefits that all individuals receive from the 
robust systems of patent and copyrights supply implicit-in-kind compensation 
that offsets, and more, the loss of individual liberty from the restraint of speech 
and productive activities. 
The key question of system design, therefore, asks what configuration of 
patents and copyrights will maximize the net gains over the libertarian 
formulation. The best approach is to determine how few deviations from the 
 
98. Bell, supra note 97, at 3. 
99. VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 261 (Ann S. Schwier & 
Alfred N. Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., Augustus M. Kelley 1971) (1927) (defining a 
class of changes in economic allocation, now referred to as Pareto improvements, that make 
at least one individual better off, and none worse off, than those individuals were ex ante). 
100. See Epstein, supra note 20; see also text accompanying note 20. For the larger 
philosophical framework, see Richard A. Epstein, The Not So Minimum Content of Natural 
Law, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 219 (2005). 
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traditional views of property in tangibles need to be made in order to develop a 
sensible system for copyrights and patents. In my view, the obvious place to 
start is with the duration of these interests, given that the distinctive feature of 
information is its capacity to be both shared and retained at the same time. That 
universal and invariant characteristic of information suggests that the infinite 
duration of ownership, which works so well for land and chattels, is a poor first 
approximation for constructing a nascent law of copyrights and patents.  
With tangible objects, it is of course possible to adopt a rule that limits 
possession to some fixed period of years, or for the life of the initial possessor. 
But note what happens with either of those configurations. The first negative 
effect is that it becomes difficult to construct or maintain improvements whose 
useful life coincides with the expected duration of the interest. If the 
improvement is not durable enough, an economic opportunity is lost. If the 
improvement lasts too long, there is a gift to the next possessor of the property. 
The situation is no better when we look to alienation, for the uncertainty in the 
duration of the term creates genuine ambiguities. It is for this reason that the 
English system eventually banned legal life estates in land, putting them behind 
a trust. And for the same reason, they are almost never created in the United 
States, even in the absence of legal impediment. Leases survive because they 
offer additional certainty in duration and often include clauses that deal with 
the treatment of improvements at the expiration of the lease, which help ease 
the transition between owners.  
Yet, what is gained for the inconvenience of state-imposed limited terms? 
Precisely nothing. Once the land reverts to the state of nature, someone else 
will seek to claim it by occupation, only to be faced by the same temporal 
limitations that handicapped the actions of the original party in possession. 
There is, in short, no way that the expiration of the limit expands the class of 
individuals who can make simultaneous use of the property. It therefore follows 
that no system in which ownership is acquired through initial occupation 
contains any temporal limitation on the duration of the estate. Quite simply, 
none should. All divisions of interest should come by contracts that bind the 
parties, and when appropriate, their successors in title. 
The tradeoffs are different with respect to intellectual property. The 
problems of alienation and transition at the expiration of the deal remain, 
although possibly in less acute form. But the social gains from the expiration of 
the copyright or invention are large because that expiration allows an extensive 
nonrivalrous use of the writing or invention to take place immediately, once 
these works are cast into the public domain. The constitutional compromise that 
recognizes the power of the United States to grant patents and copyrights with a 
limited life of protection works to split the difference between the two 
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interests.101 It first gives incentives for production (including 
commercialization); thereafter, opportunities for widespread dissemination at 
zero price in the public domain.102  
In dealing with this issue, we have to be concerned not only with the 
artificial truncation of the patent and copyright terms, but also with the 
converse situation where the duration of a patent or copyright is extended after 
it has been created. It is a large mistake (indeed a taking of private property) for 
the state to shorten by decree the period of an existing copyright or patent once 
it has been granted. By the same token, it is an improper transfer from the 
public space to extend existing patents and copyrights without a public benefit 
in return. As I have argued elsewhere, the implicit converse to the Takings 
Clause is the (conceptual) Givings Clause, “nor shall public property be given 
for private use, without just compensation,” which is an assault on giveaways 
of all kinds of interest, tangible or intangible, present or future.103 And so there 
is abundant reason to attack ferociously the decision in the Copyright Term 
Extension Act to give longer terms to holders of existing copyrights, as I have 
done since its passage.104  
Once, however, an alteration is made for that difference, it becomes less 
likely that we can identify any additional functional reason to reject the other 
pillars of the system of real and personal property dealing with exclusivity, use, 
and disposition. In particular, the rules for infringement could be patterned on 
the rules for trespass and conversion, which are well-developed for physical 
assets. Accordingly, in my preferred system, the scope of pattern coverage 
should cover the full range of inventions and writing. More specifically, in the 
patent area, the broad reading that is given to the phrase “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacturer, or composition of matter, or any new and 
useful improvement thereof,”
105
 should be given the reading that it received in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty to cover “anything under the sun” that results from 
 
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”). Needless to say, the harder question is just how long, 
for which the answer is always shorter for patents than copyrights. 
102. See sources cited supra note 8. 
103. For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 
419 (1987).  
104. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 
(1998), sustained in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). I criticize the statute in 
Richard A. Epstein, Why Libertarians Shouldn’t Be (Too) Skeptical About Intellectual 
Property 1, 10 (Progress & Freedom Found. Progress on Point Paper Series, Paper No. 13.4, 
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=981779 (defending modern intellectual property 
on empirical grounds).  
105. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
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human labor and imagination,
106
 and that rule should be maintained without 
differentiation between business method patents and others.
107
 On this issue too 
there is a close resemblance between physical and intellectual property, as 
ideas, natural laws, and natural phenomenon take the place of rivers, oceans, 
and beaches as the dominant form of common property. 
Once the scope of the property right is established, it is necessary to 
determine what actions constitute breach. In this context, infringement—
coming within the fringe—is the patent equivalent for physical invasions. For 
an infringement, the basis of liability should be strict on the one hand, and the 
remedy of choice should be an injunction that allows the owner to block the 
infringement. This property-rights regime could be backed up by a system of 
damages, which would cover compensation for losses from previous 
infringements and supply an additional deterrent against future infringement. 
Similarly, the same rules that apply to dispositions, broadly conceived to 
include sales, licenses, mortgages, assignments of all sorts, and descriptions of 
land and chattels, could carry over to copyrights and patents. If we can have 
sales and licenses of the former, then so too of the latter. Additionally, the same 
principles of antitrust law, whether they deal with cartelization or unilateral 
practices, could carry over to patent and copyright owners, just as they do to 
owners of tangible property. And finally, the same rules that govern the 
governmental taking and regulation of tangible forms of property should work 
as well with the taking or regulation of patents and copyrights.  
These transformations are less critical for trademarks and trade secrets, 
both of which better comport with the libertarian model of property.108 One 
evident sign of this is that in neither case is there any functional reason to 
impose an arbitrary limit on the duration of the interest. Since trademarks only 
have value insofar as they refer to the origin of some good, putting them into 
the public domain effectively strips them of their value. Likewise, since the 
origins of trade secrets are private creations that may be shared under 
confidentiality agreements, there is no reason to limit trade secrets‟ duration 
either, especially since the holder of the trade secret can never preclude the 
independent creation of the same invention by others. 
It is necessary, however, to identify a regrettable ambiguity in this 
approach. My implicit assumption thus far is that the law of copyright and 
 
106. 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
107. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted sub nom. Bilski v. 
Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009). Bilski abrogated State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature 
Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 
(Fed. Cir. 1994), both of which afforded broader protection to business-method patents. 
108. For my views, see Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and 
New Frontiers, 76 IND. L.J. 803 (2001). 
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patents can borrow from a sound body of classical liberal principles governing 
tangible property. But all too often, the modern law is in disarray on critical 
topics, in part because of the formless pragmatism of influential writers like 
Grey and Radin. At present, the rules governing real and personal property are 
sound in some areas but suspect in others. Thus, in general, the owner of real 
property has strong remedies of injunction to block the entrance of any other 
person onto his property, and to remove encroachments that might be found 
there.109 Yet by the same token, the California Supreme Court in Intel Corp. v. 
Hamidi110 recently analogized actions for trespass in cyberspace to those for 
trespass to chattels, concluding that an owner could use self-help to repel the 
invader but could not obtain injunctive relief from the court in the absence of 
tangible harm hampering the operation of the server. Unauthorized use of 
another‟s property, by those who can maneuver around blocks and filters, is 
now permissible in cyberspace, at least in one state. 
So the real challenge is to see the extent to which we can find errors in 
outcomes when a sound set of classical liberal principles, subject to the 
duration limitation, do not carry over to intellectual property. But it is equally 
important not to mess up one branch of law in order to correct for mistakes that 
have been made in other areas. Accordingly, I shall now turn in greater detail to 
three areas, exclusion, alienation (with its antitrust overtones), and takings, to 
show the strength of the carryover thesis. 
B. Exclusion  
Now that the out-and-out libertarian skeptics of intellectual property, such 
as Palmer and Bell, have not carried the day, the question remains of how the 
carryover across the various property fields should work. Exclusion is the 
obvious place to begin because it is a central component of any system of 
private property. Indeed, the right to exclusive possession and use is the only 
 
109. On encroachment, see Geragosian v. Union Realty Co., 193 N.E. 726, 728 (Mass. 
1935) (“The general rule is that the owner of land is entitled to an injunction for the removal 
of trespassing structures.”).  
110. 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003). Much of the scholarship regarding this case turns on the 
extent to which servers should be analogized to chattels or real property. See id. at 309. An 
attack on the real property analogies is mounted in Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the 
Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL. L. REV. 441 (2003), which, published prior to 
the California Supreme Court‟s decision in Hamidi, criticizes the lower court decision in 
favor of the defendant, Intel. For criticism of the California Supreme Court decision, see 
Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of Self-Help in Cyberspace?, 1 J.L. ECON. & 
POL‟Y 147 (2005); David McGowan, The Trespass Trouble and the Metaphor Muddle, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & POL‟Y 109 (2005). I wrote an amicus curiae brief for Intel in the California 
Supreme Court. Brief for Cal. Employment Law Council et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (No. S103781) (on file with the Stanford Law Review). 
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element of the traditional bundle of property rights that receives full-fledged 
constitutional protection under the Takings Clause.111 The rights of use and 
disposition, which are part of the traditional trilogy of property rights, are 
subject to various forms of regulation that can effectively eliminate most of the 
value from the asset in question.112 For the moment, I do not want to defend the 
stronger view that all three elements in the traditional bundle of rights should 
receive the same level of protection under both common and constitutional 
law.113 
Immediately, there is one oft-noted and inescapable difference between the 
two realms. The sharp boundary lines in physical space cannot be duplicated 
with intellectual property. In particular, claim description for patents involves 
delicate questions of exclusion and inclusion. One clear requirement in this 
regard involves the elusive test of non-obviousness, where the statutory test 
holds that a patent may not be obtained “if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as 
a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”
114
 
The basic point of this provision is that the patent protection should not be 
given to persons whose new variations add little or nothing to the existing stock 
of knowledge. In dealing with this question, the most recent Supreme Court 
pronouncement rejects the so-called “teaching, suggestion, or motivation” test 
as the sole means of denying the incremental advance.
115
 While fuzzy 
boundaries exist in real property cases, they obviously loom larger in 
intellectual property cases. The sensible social objective is to pick the test that 
minimizes the sum of decision and error costs. 
The fuzzy boundaries inherent in the description of patent claims invite, of 
 
111. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). Kaiser Aetna 
involves some real complications because it did not involve an outright transfer from the 
private owner to the United States. It only required that the private marina open its waters to 
general navigation, which in effect demoted private property into a commons to which the 
original owner had full access. But this point should only influence the amount of 
compensation, not the existence of a taking. 
112. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
113. See EPSTEIN, supra note 75, at 57-62. 
114. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006). 
115. KSR Int‟l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007). In my view, that older 
test has real virtues insofar as it limits the use of subjective testimony to deny after the fact 
the nature of the innovation. On the facts of the case, I think that the district court was 
correct to deny patentability for a supposed invention that involved merely the realignment 
of known elements. See Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int‟l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 587-588 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003). The reversal of its decision in the Federal Circuit, Teleflex Inc. v. KSR 
International Co., 119 F. App‟x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), opened up the way for the Supreme 
Court decision. 
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course, new entrants to game the system by coming as close to the original 
patent description without crossing the line. If those new inventions were made 
without a detailed knowledge of the relevant invention space, it would be easy 
in a strict liability regime to show some solicitude to those who came close to 
the line that they did not cross. But all patent claims are constructed by 
professionals who have an intimate knowledge of the relevant space. 
Accordingly, to counteract this conscious gamesmanship, courts have rightly 
resorted to the doctrine of equivalents, which asks whether the defendant‟s 
invention is close enough to the literal description of the patentee‟s invention 
that it should be held to violate the patent‟s scope.116 The analogous but less 
difficult doctrine in copyright is whether the defendant‟s work is derivative of 
the plaintiff‟s because, although it does not borrow specific words or pictures, it 
works on closely identified themes.117 These difficulties, too, cannot be evaded 
so long as patents and copyrights provide any legal protection to inventions and 
writings. No matter what remedy is chosen, the question has to be answered, 
even if infringements of IP rights are necessarily less precisely defined than 
those for physical property. Nor is it easy to set up any default presumptions on 
how to resolve close cases, for any rule that is targeted to control the 
opportunism of infringers can give too much rein to the parallel opportunism of 
copyright or patent holders. And the converse result happens if the default 
provision is reversed to favor the entitlement holders. 
Yet once the infringement is determined, the question is which remedy 
should apply: damages or an injunction. On this issue it is possible to be more 
definitive. The present state of play on this question is shaped by the critical 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C.118 At issue in the case was a choice between two rules for granting an 
injunction. The Federal Circuit applied “the general rule that courts will issue 
permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional 
circumstances.”119 In its stead, the Supreme Court adopted the traditional 
principles of equity, which made the issuance of an injunction turn on four 
 
116. The relevant provision reads, but only with difficulty, as follows: 
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing 
a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and 
such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described 
in the specification and equivalents thereof. 
35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6 (2000). For recent Supreme Court application, see Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. 
Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).  
117. E.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (denying 
action against the authors of The Cohens and the Kellys for infringement of Abie’s Irish 
Rose). 
118. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
119. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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related factors: 
(1) that [the plaintiff] has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies 
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff 
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest 
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.
120
 
One way to approach this problem is to ask which rule mirrors the rule for 
injunctive relief in physical injury cases. What makes that inquiry difficult is 
that both rules have some sort of a common law (here used in the sense that 
includes remedies that courts of equity issue in private disputes) pedigree, so 
that it is not always easy to distinguish between them. But putting aside 
questions of verbal nuance, the unmistakable difference between the two tests 
is that injunctive relief is easier to obtain under the rule announced in the 
Federal Circuit than under the Supreme Court rule. 
The Federal Circuit rule starts with a strong presumption in favor of the 
injunctive relief. In one sense, that preference follows from the definition of 
property as the right to exclude. In the patent context, this basic element of 
property theory has long been held “to provide for an exclusive right to 
inventors to make, use and vend their inventions,” leading to the creation of a 
“complete monopoly” for which injunctive relief is required as a matter of 
course.121 Damages thus become the backup remedy, since they are needed to 
compensate for past losses, where injunctive relief is futile.122 But the Patent 
Act also provides, not all that helpfully, that courts may “grant injunctions in 
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right 
secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable.”123  
The major textual question is, how did the Federal Circuit move that rule to 
a conclusion that grants the injunction save on exceptional circumstances? The 
best answer to that is that the importance of an injunction with respect to future 
harms is that it keeps open the channels for voluntary exchange, by making it 
impossible for individuals to circumvent the basic rules of property law for 
their short-term private advantage. On this issue, the encroachment cases 
involving real property offer a useful example. Normally, a defendant 
whose building encroaches on the plaintiff‟s property is required to remove the 
encroachment at great expense, even when the value of the plaintiff‟s 
underlying land is small. The rule is virtually automatic when the infringement 
is deliberate, and strict even when it is not. Two reasons explain this set of 
rules. The first is that only the injunction prevents the exercise of a private 
 
120. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. 
121. Cont‟l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423 (1908). 
122. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
123. Id. § 283. 
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power of eminent domain. The second is that only the injunction prevents the 
circumvention of voluntary transactions that work to the benefit of both sides.  
The case for an injunction is, if anything, stronger in those contexts where 
it is hard to value the profits or royalties lost in consequence of the defendant‟s 
violation. And it is commonly understood that damages are often speculative at 
best when complex technologies are involved. The injunction avoids a regime 
of compulsory licenses at the insistence of the infringer that would on average 
undercompensate the owners for their investment and make it impossible for 
patent holders to develop coherent licensing strategies that target select licenses 
under complex licensing deals.124 It is therefore better to keep the train on the 
tracks than to allow one party to deviate from the straight and narrow for 
private advantage.  
The rule in effect represents a sound categorical judgment that the harms 
from infringement are irreparable in the sense that no damage award will do as 
well to honor for the basic property right as the equitable injunction. The basic 
considerations here do not turn on the specifics of any particular invention, so 
the strong presumption is in effect a way to avoid the high administrative and 
error costs associated with case-by-case judgments. On this general view, the 
play in the joints comes from the last part of the statutory provision, which 
allows the injunction to be granted on such terms as the court deems 
reasonable. That caveat is best read to let the court take into account the 
difficult transitions that often accompany the issuance of an injunction. For 
example, it may make sense not to demand that a defendant recall at great 
expense items that have already been sold to distributors; or it may be desirable 
to delay the injunction to allow the defendant to work around the patent or 
negotiate a license with the plaintiff, paying some form of interim damages for 
the privilege. These kinds of ad hoc adjustments are certainly part of the 
equitable principles governing land, as it is often common for courts to delay 
the effect of an injunction to allow a defendant to tidy up. 
Within this framework, what counts as an “exceptional” circumstance that 
defeats injunctive relief? Here, the relevant cases fall into two separate classes. 
 
124. Evidence on this question is hard to acquire and evaluate. For one effort, see 
Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing 
of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853 (2003) (reporting that 
compulsory licensing did not have a discernible negative effect on innovation). But Chien‟s 
qualifications are in a sense more important than her results, which held only with respect to 
“licenses that were either unpredictable or did not affect important markets.” Id. at 857. 
Relax these two assumptions and there is no reason to think that the results will not flip over. 
Indeed, in her one case where these two conditions did not entirely hold, she did detect some 
decline in R&D, which suggests that larger impositions could have greater results, depending 
of course on the anticipated discount through these licensing arrangements.  
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The first of these deals with laches125 and estoppel,126 that is, with conditions 
whereby the plaintiff‟s own conduct establishes the grounds for denying or 
limiting injunctive relief. These cases do not pose a mortal, or even serious, 
threat to the dominance of voluntary transactions, because it always lies within 
the power of the plaintiff to avoid the delay or misrepresentation that becomes 
the source of the defendant‟s claim. 
The more difficult cases for the Federal Circuit rule involve the risk of 
economic extortion when a minor patent can derail a major enterprise. The 
most vivid situation is a case where a defendant‟s complex product has 
thousands of different components of which only one is covered by the 
plaintiff‟s patent. The nightmare example is the holder of a single small patent 
who wants to shut down the latest Microsoft word-processing program. The 
fear here is that the price demanded to waive injunctive relief far exceeds the 
value that the patentee could have obtained if it had licensed the product to the 
defendant before the defendant developed its new product.  
This consideration carries a good deal of weight, at least in these extreme 
cases. Yet it is instructive that there is no decided case in the Federal Circuit 
that granted an injunction under such extreme conditions, eBay included. It 
would be as if the person who owned a square foot of land under a large factory 
could require the entire factory to be ripped down because of the trespass. Quite 
simply, as the size of the overall venture looms ever larger relative to the size 
of the plaintiff‟s input, the injunctive relief falls by the wayside. It would have 
been quite possible for the Supreme Court to have affirmed the Federal Circuit 
rule by announcing that these cases of massively disparate stakes were 
inappropriate for injunctive relief, at least without allowing some additional 
time to correct the particular error by designing around the minor component. 
The traditional framework appears to be able to handle the case that is 
calculated to cause it the greatest embarrassment. The carryover from the land 
use cases to the intellectual property cases looks well-nigh complete. 
Yet what about the four-part equitable test in eBay that appears to make the 
choice of remedy in each and every patent case a fact-intensive inquiry? The 
new formulation does not mark any real advance in doctrine. Indeed, it heralds 
some retreat from the previous, narrower test. The first two components of the 
four-fold test, “irreparable injury” and “inadequate” damages, are mirror 
images of each other. It is not possible to think of any important case where the 
injury may be regarded as irreparable when the damages are adequate. What is 
missing, however, from this reformulation is the background presumption that 
 
125. Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (laches). 
126. Wang Labs. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., 103 F.3d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (allowing 
course of conduct to establish estoppel). For the parallel doctrine in real estate transactions, 
see Holbrook v. Taylor, 532 S.W.2d 763 (Ky. 1976). 
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serious institutional damage follows whenever a defendant is able to 
circumvent the voluntary market by creating what is in essence a compulsory 
license whose terms are set by a court, not the parties.  
Nor do the last two factors help advance the ball. The third factor on 
relative hardship carries with it little or no content if it invites the court in 
routine cases to make some guess as to the magnitude of the economic 
dislocations that each side suffers. How, for example, could it not be a case of 
real hardship for the plaintiff who suffers irreparable harm if an injunction is 
denied? The only way in which the term seems to resonate is in the situation 
mentioned above: the defendant has a complex device with many elements, of 
which only one tiny component infringes the plaintiff‟s patent. At that point, 
however, we are back to the one narrow exception that should be grafted onto 
the “exceptional circumstances” test.  
So this leaves the fourth element, which involves the impact of the grant or 
denial of the injunction on the public at large. In order for this factor to carry 
real weight, it is necessary to show that there will be cases in which the 
injunction seems justified between the parties but will be denied because of its 
adverse effects on third persons. It is possible to think of extreme situations 
where this might be true—the widespread use of a patented wonder drug that 
offers the last line of defense against a deadly plague, for example. Yet once 
the dispute reaches that level, it is likely that the government would interfere 
under a doctrine of public necessity, much as it does when it rips down 
buildings in order to prevent fires from destroying the community at large.127 
But short of these extreme cases, it is difficult to imagine circumstances in 
which the public interest does not require the creation and maintenance of a 
secure system of property rights to spur the innovation and commercialization 
of new technologies.  
In the end, therefore, the irreparable harm test seems to be the touchstone 
for the inquiry, and the dispute over injunctive relief seems to turn on the 
choice between rules that are applied on a categorical or a case-by-case basis. 
Taken as a whole, the post-eBay decisions show a decided, but by no means 
complete, tendency to revert back to class-based rules. To see why, it is useful 
to return to the basic categorization of injunctive relief cases. In this regard, a 
useful point of departure is a short statement by the academic defenders of the 
traditional equitable principles in their brief to the United States Supreme 
Court. That brief, of which Mark Lemley was the principal author, held that 
courts “should grant injunctions to patent owners who participate in the market, 
whether by selling the patented invention, exclusively licensing it to someone 
else who sells it, or selling a product not covered by the patent but which 
 
127. Mayor of N.Y. v. Lord, 18 Wend. 126 (N.Y. 1837). 
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competes with the infringing product.”128 This pithy statement identifies three 
situations to apply the per se rule within the context of traditional equitable 
rules: the plaintiff practices the patent, the plaintiff issues an exclusive license 
for the patent, and the plaintiff warehouses the patented technology in order to 
make some substitute technology, patented or unpatented. It is critical to 
understand both the normative uses and limitations of this principle, and its 
reception in the lower courts in the post-eBay cases. 
On practicing the patent, the post-eBay cases offer solid support for the 
proposition that the injunction should issue against a defendant whose 
infringing product is in direct competition with the plaintiff‟s.129 That 
conclusion is often accompanied by dire judicial admonitions to the 
infringer.130 The level of protection so offered does not give the practicing 
patentee protection in all cases. But there are few instances of patent 
infringement where the parties are not in direct competition, at least if the party 
who practices the patent is in a position to license it to someone else who is.  
That possibility in turn gives rise to the second key element, which is the 
exclusive licensing of a patent. In principle, the exclusive license resembles a 
sale insofar as the full beneficial use of the patent now lies in the patentee. The 
rule here is not dissimilar to the rule that asks about the sale or lease of a 
structure for tax or business purposes. If the useful life of a building is twenty-
five years, a lease for thirty years leaves the original owner with a reversionary 
interest that has no value. The transaction is therefore better treated as a sale of 
the asset, so that the depreciation deduction must be taken by the erstwhile 
lessee rather than the erstwhile property owner. Since patents have finite useful 
lives, it simply makes no sense to conceive of a sale that exceeds the duration 
of the patent life. 
The exclusive license differs from the sale, however, in that there is no 
fixed price for the patent use, as patent royalties are calibrated to the intensity 
of use. In addition, exclusive licenses are complex documents that often allow 
 
128. Brief of Fifty-Two Intellectual Property Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 9, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130). For 
a response, see Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, eBay, 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130) [hereinafter eBay Amicus Brief Supporting 
Respondent], which I coauthored with F. Scott Kieff and R. Polk Wagner. David Teece, an 
economist at the University of California, Berkeley, also aided in the drafting of the brief. 
129. See TruePosition, Inc. v. Andrew Corp., 568 F. Supp. 2d 500 (D. Del. 2008) 
(injunction against direct competitor); TiVo, Inc. v. Echostar Commc‟ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 
2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (same). 
130. See, e.g., 3M Innovative Props. Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp., No. 01-1781, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70263, at *5-*6 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006) (“One who elects to build a 
business on a product found to infringe cannot be heard to complain if an injunction against 
continuing infringement destroys the business so elected.” (quoting Windsurfing Int‟l v. 
AMF, Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1986))). 
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the patentee or licensee to terminate the arrangement for cause, after the 
passage of time, and the like. The key point to understand, however, is that 
these exclusive licenses are yet another illustration of the key proposition that 
two parties are allowed to divide rights between them in whatever fashion they 
see fit so long as they do not trench on the entitlements of any third parties. 
Allowing the exclusive licensee to sue for the injunction thus preserves the 
remedial status quo against outsiders.  
There is, unfortunately, some legal authority to the effect that only the 
exclusive licensee is entitled to seek injunctive relief on the ground that any 
injury to the licensor is not “irreparable.”131 That limitation makes no sense 
because it creates a situation where a license to two or more parties reduces 
their (combined) remedial rights against an outsider. One of the signs of an 
efficient contract is the allocation of entitlements between the parties that 
maximizes their joint wealth. If the licensor has a level of expertise in litigation 
that its various licensees cannot match—perhaps because he owns a portfolio of 
patents—the litigation system will work better if the licensor controls litigation. 
A still more serious limitation of this formulation is that it appears to imply 
that injunctive relief is a chancy proposition whenever a patentee issues 
multiple nonexclusive licenses. In this situation, the dangers are acute because 
it is highly unlikely that one of a large number of licensees would have 
sufficient incentive to enjoin the outside infringer. He bears all the cost of the 
change and gets only a fraction of the benefits. When nonexclusive licenses 
arise with tangible property, the licensor normally controls the litigation 
precisely because he is in the best position to internalize the largest fraction of 
the gains. If that action is not allowed, there is a real danger that the entire 
consensual system of licenses will unravel. The dutiful licensee is at a 
competitive disadvantage against the willful infringer, and thus has every 
incentive to join the ranks of willful patent infringers. In a two-party situation, 
someone could make the (incorrect) argument that the costs of litigation for 
damages are not all that greater than the costs of negotiating a complex 
licensing agreement. But when there are tens or hundreds of licensees, the 
negotiation costs, once standardized, increase slowly, while the litigation costs 
most assuredly do not, as each defendant presents its own special problems that 
start with service of process and extend through final judgment. Virtually every 
sensible collective operation allows a party at the center to control litigation for 
the group. The restriction of injunctive relief to exclusive licensees works a 
dramatic reduction in the effectiveness of the patent system for which there is 
no analogy for licenses to use tangible forms of property, and no discernible 
efficiency justification. The make-or-license decision should not be skewed by 
 
131. See supra at pp. 133-138 for a discussion of eBay‟s four-part equitable test. 
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making the strong remedy dependent on choosing one form of business 
transaction. There is no reason to tilt the willingness to license, or the choice of 
licensees, by the selective availability of injunctive relief. Whether a patentee 
has one patent or a thousand in its portfolio, the choice of legal relief should 
never depend on how a patentee chooses to exploit his invention. 
In sum, it looks as though any careful examination of the equities in the 
post-eBay world should collapse back into the initial presumption in favor of 
injunctive relief. In all the cases stated, that presumption should remain. The 
case of the tiny patent who exercises the exorbitant holdup does need some 
attention at the margins, but it should never be the tail that wags the patent dog. 
Nothing in the traditional principles of equity requires that radical revision of 
the right to exclude that eBay seems to invite. 
The position here tracks, again, the analysis of tangible property. As 
indicated earlier, the proper approach treats the limited patent term as irrelevant 
to the debate over the choice remedies. On this question, the common law 
approach to encroachment cases is especially relevant. This position is 
defended at length in a brief that I submitted with Scott Kieff and Polk 
Wagner.132 The key point is this: the use of the remedy that requires the 
wrongdoer to rip down its own structures looks inefficient from the ex post 
point of view. What gain is there in knocking down a skyscraper to return a 
couple of inches of land to the owner? But the ex post inefficiency has to be 
weighed against the ex ante advantage, which is that this rule reduces the 
willingness of potential encroachers to circumvent the property rights system 
by taking first and paying damages later.133  
This defense of the Federal Circuit rule provoked a sharp response from 
Peter Menell, of the University of California, Berkeley,134 who mistakenly saw 
in our contention a reversion to some mystical Blackstone model that treats all 
property rights as “perpetual, exclusive, and inviolate”135—Menell‟s ill-chosen 
words and not mine. All three of these terms are overstated. As noted earlier, it 
is correct to subject the property rights in both patents and copyrights to limited 
terms. Indeed, on previous occasions—never cited by Menell—I cautioned 
against the unthinking transfer of the Blackstone model of property to patents 
 
132.  eBay Amicus Brief Supporting Respondent, supra note 128. 
133. See, e.g., Voda v. Cordis Corp., 536 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
134. The full exchange was printed in Regulation. See Peter S. Menell, Intellectual 
Property and the Property Rights Movement, REG., Fall 2007, at 36 [hereinafter Menell, 
Property Rights Movement]; Richard A. Epstein, The Property Rights Movement and 
Intellectual Property: A Response to Peter Menell, REG., Winter 2008, at 58; Peter S. 
Menell, Intellectual Property and the Law of Land: A Reply to Richard Epstein, REG., 
Winter 2008, at 64; Richard A. Epstein, A Final Response to Menell, REG., Spring 2008, at 
2. 
135. Menell, Property Rights Movement, supra note 134, at 38. 
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and copyrights.136 But once the temporal adjustment is made, the rules on 
exclusion work, for in fact the boundary conditions on land have themselves 
never been treated as absolute and inviolate either. I have already mentioned 
rules on laches, estoppel, and disproportionate impact. In addition, it is 
appropriate to take note of the rules surrounding private necessity and public 
necessity cases at common law.137 The law of nuisance also contains a live-
and-let-live rule that allows for small reciprocal harms to go uncompensated 
and imposes obligations of lateral support for the land of neighbors. All of 
these small adjustments improve the value of land for all others. Finally, the 
eminent domain power should remain for takings of public use, especially 
when assembly problems block voluntary transfers.138 The clear moral here is 
that the only way to see the carryover between land law and intellectual 
property is to offer an accurate explication of the former, which Menell does 
not provide. 
C. Rights of Alienation  
The next major question deals with limitations on the sale, licensing, and 
assignment of intellectual property. In dealing with tangible property, the 
distinction between land and chattels matters because the ideal of free 
alienation is more closely achieved with real property than for chattels. With 
land, at one time various legal doctrines restricted the use of servitudes, but 
modern developments in this area have removed most of the legal impediments 
against alienation, thereby facilitating the creation of complex planned-unit 
developments and condominiums.139 But the situation is far less clear with 
respect to chattels, where the general rule is that restrictive covenants do not 
run in the same fashion that they do for land.  
The role of this disjunction between different forms of property was 
flagged in perceptive form as early as 1928 by Zechariah Chafee, who asked 
the fundamental question of the extent to which equitable servitudes ran with 
chattels.140 In a real sense, Chafee adumbrated the position that I have adopted 
 
136. See Epstein, supra note 108, at 804-06; see also Epstein, supra note 104, at 6. 
137. See, e.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). 
138. On the use of eminent domain to acquire property from one private party to be 
transferred to another in the name of economic development, see Kelo v. City of New 
London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (recognizing economic development as a potentially valid 
“public use” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment‟s Takings Clause). 
139. See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners‟ Ass‟n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 
793 (N.Y. 1938) (allowing a property owners‟ association to enforce a restrictive covenant 
against a bank that acquired title by judicial sale). 
140. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 
(1928) [hereinafter Chafee, Servitudes on Chattels]. For a reprise, see Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 
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here. His first instinct was to assume the soundness of the basic rule of Tulk v. 
Moxhay,141 whereby negative servitudes ran against all persons who had notice 
of their terms. In that decision, The Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, said 
quite sensibly that if these covenants did not run with the land against persons 
who had notice of their existence, “it would be impossible for an owner of land 
to sell part of it without incurring the risk of rendering what he retains 
worthless.”142 The clear implication of this position is that there may well be 
less alienation of real property if the covenants are not enforced than if they 
are. Nor did he see any inconvenience from the rule:  
Of course, the price would be affected by the covenant, and nothing could be 
more inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able to sell the 
property the next day for a greater price, in consideration of the assignee being 
allowed to escape from the liability which he had himself undertaken.
143
  
The question that Chafee posed for himself was whether there was any 
reason to displace this basic model in the case of chattels. His discussion 
quickly turned to many cases dealing with the intersection between antitrust 
and patent issues. On the larger methodological question, he took this sensible 
position, lamenting in particular the logic of Justice Hughes in Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.144 for its inability to offer 
any reason for a distinction between land and chattels sufficient to offset the 
reasons for permitting the creation of equitable interests in both types of 
property which are afforded by the decisions on trusts and specific 
performance. There may, of course, be specific objections to particular 
restrictions on chattels, such as price maintenance and tying contracts, which 
must be considered on their merits; but such a discriminating treatment is very 
different from a wholesale rejection of equitable servitudes on chattels on the 
ground that there is some fundamental and eternal difference between personal 
and real property.
145
 
Consistent with his general message, Chafee then devotes an extensive but 
inconclusive effort to weighing the advantages of first the resale price 
maintenance rule,146 and thereafter the rule on territorial restrictions for intra-
brand competition.147 His initial effort was to see if these territorial restrictions 
have the kind of negative effect on the retained interest of the original owner 
 
The Music Goes Round and Round: Equitable Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV. L. REV. 
1250 (1956).  
141. Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch.), also discussed supra note 47. 
142. Id. at 1144.  
143. Id.  
144. 220 U.S. 373 (1911), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, 
Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
145. Chafee, Servitudes on Chattels, supra note 140, at 984.  
146. Id. at 987-95. 
147. Id. at 995-98. 
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that spurred the use of the restricted covenant in Tulk.148 After satisfying 
himself that they did not, he turns to more economic arguments that address in 
an oblique fashion the risks of free riding of one retailer on the efforts of 
another, which these vertical restraints are designed to counteract.149 In 
general, Chafee concludes that the case has not been made to deviate from 
Tulk.  
This early interaction between the formal rules on servitudes and the more 
concrete concern with economic arrangements carries over to the present day. 
There is no doubt that the older tradition, which is reluctant to enforce restraints 
on alienation, even against strangers who take “with knowledge,” continues to 
operate today, even in contexts as compelling as the land use regime in Tulk. 
The older rule prohibiting restraints on alienation can create immense 
difficulties in the distribution of software if the assignee of the original 
purchaser is to make more intensive use of the program than the assignor or to 
evade restrictions on consequential damages.150 Rules like the “first sale” 
doctrine in copyright law show the same dogged refusal to accept contractual 
restrictions on the resale of copyrighted materials.151  
Moving on, there are a number of antitrust decisions dealing with unilateral 
practices that lead to the excessive imposition of liability, a situation that has 
been much improved with the latest generation of Supreme Court decisions.152 
And finally, as noted, the takings law has evolved in a most unfortunate 
direction in the Penn Central case.153 These discrepancies matter as to how 
current bodies of law governing tangible forms of property carry over to 
intellectual property. Quite simply, as a descriptive matter, the strongest 
objection to the carryover approach is often that it relies on subpar rules for 
 
148. Id. at 985-86. 
149. Id. at 988-89. 
150. See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (holding 
a “shrinkwrap” license, which indicated that conditions on use were contained within the 
product packaging, to be unenforceable, thereby permitting the software purchaser to exploit 
the copyrighted contents without restriction), rev’d and remanded, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 
1996). For my comments on the case, see Richard A. Epstein, ProCD v. Zeidenberg: Do 
Doctrine and Function Mix?, in CONTRACTS STORIES 94 (Douglas G. Baird ed., 2007). 
151. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy or 
phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord.”). 
152. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) 
(abandoning per se rule in resale price maintenance cases); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-
Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007) (adopting narrow tests for liability 
for predatory bidding cases); Verizon Commc‟ns Inc. v. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004) 
(adopting a narrow view of duties to deal under the antitrust laws). 
153. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
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land and chattels to set the framework for intellectual property rules. As a 
normative matter, however, these difficulties do not register. On this approach, 
the first order of business is to construct the ideal set of rules for land and 
chattels and see the extent to which these rules survive in other contexts, 
whether cyberspace, as in Hamidi,
154
 or intellectual property, which is our 
primary concern here.  
1. Licensing  
Owners of property are normally entitled under current law to dispose of it 
as they see fit or to convey it to whomever they so please, which is as it should 
be. These new owners are in turn entitled to relicense what they have received 
to third persons, so long as they do not violate the terms or conditions of the 
original license. These multiple transactions help wring the last unit of value 
out of the underlying asset. Accordingly, the state should not impose 
restrictions on this right of alienation unless these can be strictly justified to 
protect the interests of other individuals. Under this view, the owner of property 
is not under any duty to make an outright sale of a property. Instead, it is 
possible to lease it for a term of years, whereby the lessee gains exclusive rights 
to the premises for the duration of the lease. Alternatively, an owner can give a 
nonexclusive license to use some resources. In each case the owner will have to 
bear the costs of any restriction imposed, for he will not be able to charge the 
same price for a limited interest as for an expanded one and will incur the costs 
of monitoring licensee use to guard against violations. The restrictions in 
question therefore will typically be imposed only where some collateral gain 
justifies the cost in question. Therefore, except for a few (and controversial) 
efforts at monopolization, the normal rule is, and should be, one of freedom of 
contract. Unfortunately, modern patent law has developed two distinctive 
limitations on freedom of contract that require separate discussion: the removal 
of licensee estoppel and the first sale doctrine. In addition, the patent law has 
imposed restrictions on the right to alienate causes of action for patent 
infringement. I consider each of these areas in turn. 
2. Licensee estoppel  
One insistent question in patent law is whether the general doctrines of 
estoppel apply to patent licenses, just as they do with leases of real property. 
Just that approach was taken by the California Supreme Court in Adkins v. 
Lear, Inc.155 There, the court was confronted with a patent license that in so 
 
154. Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 71 P.3d 296 (Cal. 2003).  
155. 435 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1967), vacated, 395 U.S. 653 (1969). 
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many terms estopped the licensee from challenging the validity of the patent:156  
[O]ne of the oldest doctrines in the field of patent law establishes that so long 
as a licensee is operating under a license agreement he is estopped to deny the 
validity of his licensor‟s patent in a suit for royalties under the agreement. The 
theory underlying this doctrine is that a licensee should not be permitted to 
enjoy the benefit afforded by the agreement while simultaneously urging that 
the patent which forms the basis of the agreement is void.
157
  
In effect, the court respected the mutual dependence of the contractual 
conditions. In so doing, the California Supreme Court showed a real mastery of 
basic patent law principles in dealing with various claim construction issues. 
But for our purposes the key proposition was that it treated the proper 
construction and enforcement of the license solely as a matter of state law.158 
Accordingly, the court then applied the general rule to construe the agreement 
in light of the expressed intentions of the parties. Its careful examination of the 
agreement led it to conclude that the corporate licensee, Lear, could not 
lawfully terminate the agreement simply because some of Adkins‟s patent 
claims had been rejected. The case contained no discussion of any distinctive 
public policy issues raised by patents. The concordance between the general 
rules for licenses and those for patent licenses was complete. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the entire mood of the 
discussion changed. Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, first noted 
that the California (state) law view on license estoppel followed earlier 
Supreme Court precedent on the subject.159 But the Court reexamined that prior 
doctrine in light of other decisions in intellectual property “emphasizing the 
strong federal policy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit 
patent protection.”160 It then resolved the conflict between general contract 
principles and the patent law as follows: 
Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they are 
balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and free 
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain. 
Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough economic incentive 
 
156. Justice Mosk wrote for a unanimous court: “Under the doctrine of licensee 
estoppel, Lear would be prohibited from challenging the validity of Adkins‟ patent if the 
agreement had not been validly terminated. Where a license agreement specifies the 
conditions under which termination may occur, those conditions must be satisfied in order to 
effect a valid termination.” Id. at 331. 
157. Id. at 325-26. 
158. The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over actions arising under patent 
laws, but where a plaintiff seeks to enforce a patent licensing agreement, the action “is not a 
suit under the patent laws of the United States, and cannot be maintained in a federal court as 
such.” Id. at 325 (quoting Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 502 (1926)). 
159. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969). 
160. Id. 
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to challenge the patentability of an inventor‟s discovery. If they are muzzled, 
the public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-be monopolists 
without need or justification. We think it plain that the technical requirements 
of contract doctrine must give way before the demands of the public interest in 
the typical situation involving the negotiation of a license after a patent has 
issued.
161
 
In reaching its distinctive conclusion under the patent law, the Court did 
not find any functional justifications for the “technical requirements” of 
contract law. In so doing it missed the fundamental difficulty associated with 
the problem for both real and intellectual property. The hidden cost of the 
Court‟s rule relates to the willingness of individuals to license their property in 
the first place. That willingness will be reduced in all cases if the putative 
licensor knows that the licensee can take information acquired through the 
license arrangement and use it for a host of other purposes, including 
undermining the validity of the patent. The same issue appears to arise whether 
the decisive information is acquired by examining the recorded deeds in the 
chain of title for leased property or the various records involved in the creation 
of the license. The risk of the Lear rule is therefore that it induces patent 
holders to be choosier in the selection of their licensees, and to be charier in the 
sharing of information with the licensees whom they do choose, thereby 
rendering the licenses less valuable to both sides. This cost is borne in all cases, 
not just those in which there are successful claims of invalidity, some of which 
are likely to be erroneously decided. The upshot, therefore, is that the number 
of licenses, the kinds of licenses, and the licensee royalties will all change in 
response to the alteration of the legal rule. Indeed, any uncertainty about the 
validity of the agreement reduces the level of peaceful coexistence that the two 
sides can expect from the dealing. Finality matters as much with patents as with 
all other business arrangements.  
The issue, then, is whether the distinctive feature of patent monopolies 
requires an alteration of the general rule of estoppel, to which the answer 
appears to be negative. The argument cannot be that the Supreme Court‟s rule 
has no advantages, for on the plus side it would lead to exposing more invalid 
patents. But how strong is that effect in light of the disruptions already 
mentioned to the voluntary licensing system? There are two answers. First, the 
standard patent is obtained only by a full and accurate description of its claims, 
and is always subject to nullification by any party who conducts a successful 
search of public materials for prior art that teaches the patented technology or 
shows that the patentee‟s initial disclosure was insufficient. There is no similar 
threat to the validity of the standard real estate leases. These third-party patent 
challenges, which have never been touched by the doctrine of estoppel, have 
 
161. Id. at 670-71. 
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often proved successful. Allowing the licensee to sue adds little by way of 
additional deterrence to filing defective patents. The shorter duration of the 
patent, relative to other kinds of lease arrangements, means that the dislocation 
is less pronounced in this area than for long-term real estate transactions.  
Second, removing estoppel is not a targeted method for challenging patent 
abuses. To be sure, there may well be some case in which the patentee and the 
licensee have an interest in seeking to control and divide a market in ways that 
could run counter to the antitrust laws, which have little patience for horizontal 
divisions of markets and price fixing. There is, for example, in connection with 
the Hatch-Waxman Act,162 an extensive body of case law that addresses the 
question of whether a settlement between the incumbent patentee and the first 
new entrant should be subject to liability under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.163 Allowing these licensing agreements to be unenforceable could very 
well help prevent these collusive agreements. The problem is more complex 
than might appear because oftentimes these agreements arise out of settlements 
of infringement actions brought against the new entrant. Clearly the policies of 
the antitrust law may conflict with the desire to make bona fide settlements of 
disputes. And it could easily be that no such settlement should be enforceable 
unless there is some judicial oversight to deal with third-party interests. But no 
matter how this tension is resolved, the antitrust laws are a far better vehicle to 
deal with this question than the basic rules of licensee estoppel, which apply 
across the board whether or not there is any antitrust offense lurking in the 
background. Once again, covert tools are bad tools in dealing with these issues. 
The Supreme Court is right to allude to competition issues in Lear, but wrong 
 
162. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 21, 
35, and 42 U.S.C.). The Act established a fast-track method for approval of generic drugs, 
along with strategic protections for the brand-name manufacturers—an attempt to encourage 
entry but also respect existing patent rights. 
163. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). Two particular infringement settlement 
agreements, which were both condemned as anticompetitive, involved patented brand-name 
firms paying monthly or quarterly fees to the generic manufacturer to stay off the market 
during litigation and not to waive its statutory 180-day period of exclusivity. See In re 
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (finding payments to 
the generic manufacturer to be naked market allocation that was per se illegal under section 
one of the Sherman Act), aff’d, 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Abbott Labs., No. C-
3945, 2000 FTC LEXIS 65, at *14 (May 22, 2000) (alleging that the “purpose and effect” of 
the payment was to prevent entry). There has been rich scholarly debate on the social 
desirability of allowing, prohibiting, or restricting such agreements. See, e.g., Daniel A. 
Crane, Ease Over Accuracy in Assessing Patent Settlements, 88 MINN. L. REV. 698 (2004); 
Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust 
Rules and Economic Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747 (2002); Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark 
Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 
MINN. L. REV. 1719 (2003). 
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to think that they are strong enough to countenance the wholesale destruction of 
the voluntary market when the antitrust law provides a more focused response.  
The one silver lining in the Lear rule, as applied in the lower courts, was 
that it appeared that the licensee had to throw off the license in order to 
maintain the challenge to the underlying patent. At that point, the licensee ran 
the serious risk of being found guilty of willful infringement, and thus subject 
to heavy financial risks. Nor could the licensee continue to receive any of the 
collateral benefits supplied under that license agreement. The question that 
arises, therefore, is how far the appeal to public policy goes in upsetting the 
standard principles of contract. Just this question has been ducked for the time 
being in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.164 The major unresolved issue is 
whether a licensee is entitled to continue to take advantage of the full benefits 
received under the license agreement so long as he keeps royalty payments 
current, while at the same time challenging the validity of the patent. If so, the 
resulting risks to licensing are exponentially larger than under Lear.  
Indeed, it is an open question whether any two parties could ever settle a 
patent dispute with a license agreement that the licensee could not seek 
thereafter to upset by another round of litigation. The protection of competition 
is only one goal of the general patent law—and one often achieved by a legal 
system that encourages innovation so as to create competitive patented 
technologies. A second major goal of any legal system is to secure the stability 
of expectations such that people can plan today the distribution of rights that 
they wish to enjoy tomorrow. It seems very clear that the disregard of standard 
contractual protections carries with it social as well as private losses. 
3. First sale  
The alienability of intellectual property licenses has also been attacked 
under the first sale doctrine, both in copyright and patent law. Thus copyright 
law contains the explicit statutory “first sale” doctrine set out earlier. The 
analogous doctrine of patent law is developed judicially under the rubric of 
patent exhaustion,165 even though the first sale label used in copyrights seems 
 
164. 549 U.S. 118 (2007). This decision went off on various procedural questions 
about declaratory judgments. The Federal Circuit had previously held that so long as the 
licensee was in good standing under the terms of the patent, the licensee could not maintain a 
declaratory action, thereby ruling out all efforts to attack the validity of a patent under which 
payments were raised. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 962-63 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005). The liberalized Supreme Court declaratory judgment rules open up this 
possibility.  
165. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (adopting 
the “exhaustion” doctrine to bar patentee suit against the subsequent lawful purchaser of the 
patented item). 
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more accurate.166 However styled, both areas are amenable to the same 
analysis. In principle the proper approach to all these consensual restraints on 
alienation is to allow them unless it can be shown that the prohibition against 
resale is intended to bolster the monopoly position of a firm with market 
power—the standard antitrust concern.167 This simple application of the 
existing principle is but one more effort to integrate intellectual property with 
other areas of law, so that there is no need to face the overlap between rival 
systems of law. As Scott Kieff and Troy Paredes have noted, straightforward 
application of existing legal frameworks, or a “basics approach,” avoids the 
risk of “one-off doctrines” where intellectual property law intersects with other 
areas of law, including antitrust.168  
As noted earlier, the first sale doctrine in copyright law eliminates the 
ability of the copyright holder to restrict the otherwise unhindered first acquirer 
of a copyrighted article to transfer the copyrighted article to a third person.169 
In these cases, the transfer of a single copyrighted article does not in and of 
itself appear to raise any particular antitrust concerns. The hallmark for antitrust 
in cases of single firms is the existence of some degree of market power, which 
is always lacking when any individual copyrighted work has to compete in a 
broad marketplace teeming with substitute works. In this context, it is far from 
evident that the basic copyright law should include a first sale doctrine that 
undermines freedom of contract by invalidating consensual restrictions of any 
further sale or disposition. These restrictions on contractual freedom can never 
be justified by the question-begging assertion that they are inconsistent with the 
“inherent” nature of chattels or copyrighted works. The same language has 
often been used, with equally little content, to justify knocking out various 
consensual restrictions on the alienation of real property on the equally 
uninformative ground that these restraints are “repugnant” to the underlying 
interest.
170
 Finding a systematic negative externality generated by these 
 
166. See Judge Giles S. Rich, Luncheon Address at the Sixth Annual Conference on 
International Intellectual Property Law & Policy at Fordham University School of Law (Apr. 
16, 1998), in F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1144 (4th ed. 2008). 
167. For one illustration of the restraints on alienation in the context of the Sherman 
Act, see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d 
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). I cannot discuss these issues here, except to mention that 
in most cases the restraints on alienation do little to advance the monopoly position of the 
dominant firm. For my views, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE: WHY LESS IS MORE 40-53 (2007). 
168. Kieff & Paredes, supra note 8, at 179. 
169. See Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L‟anza Research Int‟l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 152 
(1998) (placing the copyrighted item in the stream of commerce means the copyright holder 
“has exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution”). 
170. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 2009) (“Conditions restraining alienation, 
when repugnant to the interest created, are void.”). 
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restrictions is needed for justifying their imposition. Since patents and 
copyrights don‟t pollute, it is far more difficult to find these in the world of 
intellectual property than in ordinary physical space. 
The weakness of the current legal position is made evident by the strong 
contrast it articulates between sales (or outright transfers) and licenses of 
particular works, whereby the transferor holds some retained interest in the 
underlying property. Here, the underlying property is the article of commerce, 
not the copyright. In its standard formulation, the first “sale” doctrine does not 
apply to limited licenses, even though it applies to sales and any other outright 
transfer of a copyrighted work that the original copyright holder makes to an 
initial recipient. That is the force of the words “otherwise dispose” in the 
statutory provision.171  
The relevant issues came into sharp relief in a recent decision involving 
promotional CDs: UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto.172 In that case, UMG had 
issued a series of promotional (stripped down) CDs free of charge to insiders in 
the Hollywood scene in order to promote the full CD before selling it to the 
general public. All promotional CDs were labeled (so as to give notice to third 
parties) with the following legend: 
This CD is the property of the record company and is licensed to the intended 
recipient for personal use only. Acceptance of this CD shall constitute an 
agreement to comply with the terms of the license. Resale or transfer of 
possession is not allowed and may be punishable under federal and state 
laws.
173
 
With obvious knowledge of the restrictions, the defendant sold them to 
third persons on eBay. The plaintiff then sued on the terms of the license to 
block the sales. The defendant prevailed in this case on the strength of the first 
sale doctrine. The logic of the decision, and its errors in principle, require some 
discussion. The initial point is that current law permits these restrictions under 
licenses but not for sales, so that someone has to decide what kind of 
transaction was at stake. Since matters of public policy were invoked to 
invalidate the restrictions on subsequent alienation, any characterization of the 
transaction that the transferor makes is not decisive. The question then is how 
licenses should be functionally distinguished from sales. Two tests present 
themselves: The first is whether the licensor retained any interest in the CD, so 
as to be able to call for its return. That return was not required. The second 
question is whether the transferee bears any risk of loss in the transaction that 
reflects the ownership claims of the transferor. Again, the answer is in the 
negative. It follows therefore that the transaction is an outright gift (since free 
 
171. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006). 
172. 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (C.D. Cal. 2008). 
173. Id. at 1058. 
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of charge) and not a license. The transaction is therefore caught by the first sale 
rule. Notice is immaterial and the request for an injunction fails.  
It is therefore hard to quarrel with the result in Augusto under hornbook 
law. But recall the overarching inquiry is whether the statutory result is sound 
as a matter of first principle. And here the clear result should come out the 
other way. The initial point to note is that the only situation in which the 
restraint on alienation makes sense is if the transferor is seeking to obtain some 
monopoly profit, which seems hardly likely from the mass distribution of 
copies of the promotional CD. But even if we treat market power as irrelevant, 
Augusto is not a case where the original owner is seeking to gain revenues on 
both sales, or even on the second sale alone. Recall that the initial transaction 
was a gift, so that the copyright holder exacted no price at all. Rather, the object 
of the original transaction was to allow influential opinion leaders to hear the 
record in order to promote its sale more widely, which works to the benefit of 
both the copyright holders and potential purchasers of the CD. This transaction 
seems, therefore, to be largely immune to criticism on efficiency grounds.  
The consequences of the erroneous decision are not benign. Augusto makes 
future promotional efforts more difficult. One possibility is that the copyright 
holder will require the insiders to pay for the CD in order to recoup something 
from the anticipated future sale—a bad way to promote music. A second 
strategy is to require that the CD be returned on payment of a penalty, so as to 
make good the license characteristic. But those requirements are otiose, 
because the licensor has no need for the return of a promotional CD, nor the 
desire to endure the fuss and bother of collecting money for its no return. What 
is really desired in all these cases is feedback information about the 
performance, which could lead to its improvement, much as circulating drafts 
of an article allows an author to make revisions before final publication. So 
writing the provisions in the agreement is likely to lead to a policy of 
systematic non-enforcement so that the de facto gift characterization takes hold. 
And for what purpose? 
The Copyright Act rules on first sale make no sense. Rather, the right way 
to look at first sale for copyrights is through the eyes of the uniform body of 
law on servitudes. The modern reform of servitudes in the Restatement calls 
(rightly) for the unification of the rules on easements and restrictive 
covenants,174 which thus returns the modern law to the Roman position.175 It 
also refuses to use any argument based on the inherent nature of these interests 
to limit their alienability, but candidly addresses the relevant policy issues by 
 
174. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1(2) (2000). For an account of 
the law offered by its chief draftsman, see Susan F. French, Highlights of the New 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 225 (2000).  
175. See, e.g., G. INST. 2.14, 2.31 (W.M. Gordon & O.F. Robinson trans.). 
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dealing with such matters as racially restrictive covenants and covenants in aid 
of monopolization. Its unified approach thus makes it wholly irrelevant whether 
the promotional CD transaction is characterized as a lease or a sale. All that 
matters are the principled grounds, if any, for the particular restraint on 
alienation. It is ironic that the people who freely champion the economic 
rationalization of intellectual property—Mark Lemley argued the case for 
Augusto—end up relying on solely formal grounds to defend the separate 
treatment of real and intellectual property.  
The analogous doctrine to first sale in copyright is the principle of patent 
exhaustion. In its traditional form, the doctrine holds that the power of the 
patent is exhausted after its initial unrestricted sale, so that all future takers of 
the patented article take free and clear of any patent restriction.176 This rule 
tracks the rationale for the first sale doctrine in copyright. Make sure that the 
holder of the patent is entitled to exact only one fee for the sale of each object. 
Once again, however, the rationale seems flawed, at least if the buyer of 
the original article is on notice of the restrictions that were contained in the 
original sale transactions, many of which may have been suggested by a buyer 
anxious to secure a lower price. The knowledge that some second payment will 
be required under the patent statutes will result in a reduction in price that the 
original purchaser will pay to the patentee. Indeed, if the fee for the second 
transaction is uncertain, all parties could lose from the arrangement. 
Accordingly, in most situations if the patentee wants to collect the maximum 
revenue for the sale or license of a patented item, he will do well to exact a 
single charge in the first instance in order to remove that residual uncertainty, 
thereby increasing overall revenues. 
What then should be made of those cases in which the patentee, despite this 
consideration, still wishes to impose this restriction on sale? The exaction of 
monopoly profit does not seem the likely answer in these cases, given the logic 
stated above. Hence it becomes important to ask if there is any efficiency gain 
in question. That issue is often hard to determine, but it is instructive to note 
that many of the cases involving the patent exhaustion doctrine involve 
potential tie-ins that also raise antitrust concerns. For example, in Morton Salt 
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co.,177 the Supreme Court held unenforceable a patent 
over a machine for depositing salt tablets because it was a tied-sale that 
required the buyer to purchase Morton‟s unpatented salt tablets. In this 
particular instance, the correct question to ask is whether the tie-in arrangement 
should be regarded as an effort to extend or lever a monopoly position into a 
 
176. See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852) (holding 
that actions against the assignee of a patented article go outside the “limits of the 
monopoly”). 
177. 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
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second area by virtue of the tie.  
Under the antitrust law of that period, such a tie-in was treated as a per se 
violation of the antitrust law so long as the defendant firm possessed the 
requisite degree of market power.178 More concretely, in the antitrust context, 
Justice Stone rejected the various efficiency explanations for the tie, including 
using the salt consumption as a way to monitor the intensity of use of the 
equipment so as to allow for price discrimination among buyers. That hostile 
attitude toward tie-ins has been moderated by the subsequent movement toward 
the rule-of-reason analysis in tie-in cases.179 Accordingly, the key point to note 
throughout is that the sensible approach to restraints on alienation in patents 
should rest on antitrust principles, and not on some special idea of patent 
misuse that extends more, or less, broadly than the general doctrine. On this 
point, some authority in the Federal Circuit treats the misuse doctrine under the 
patent law as somewhat broader than it is under the antitrust law.180 But the 
integration of antitrust and patent law should preclude this ad hoc response.181 
In this instance, the categorical denunciation of tie-ins should, as has happened, 
fall by the wayside in both cases. 
The 1952 Patent Act introduced provisions that limited the scope of the 
patent misuse doctrine,182 which moves strongly in the direction of integrating 
the two systems. Just recently, however, the Supreme Court took a (unanimous) 
step backwards in its decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, 
Inc.,183 which held that the exhaustion doctrine applied in this three-cornered 
situation. LG Electronics (LGE) had entered into an agreement (pursuant to the 
settlement of a patent dispute) that allowed Intel to obtain a limited license to 
LGE‟s patented technology at a price lower than that which it would have had 
to pay for an unlimited license. As part of that agreement, Intel agreed to give 
notice to all third-party purchasers of Intel‟s chips that they had to obtain a 
license from LGE in order to use the patented technology. Intel gave the 
required notice to Quanta, which in turn claimed that it took Intel‟s patented 
microchips free and clear of any obligation to LGE under the patent exhaustion 
doctrine.  
One instructive issue in the case was whether the restraints in the 
 
178. Int‟l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
179. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984).  
180. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
181. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND 
EXECUTION 273 (2005) (noting that “the Federal Circuit‟s position seems incredible to 
someone familiar with the expansive body of antitrust doctrine,” given that “§2 [of the 
Sherman Act] reaches every act that monopolizes or dangerously threatens to do so”). 
182. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, § 1, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 35 U.S.C.). The relevant provision is 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2000). 
183. 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). 
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LGE/Intel settlement could attract any attention under the antitrust law. That 
question was not explicitly addressed by Justice Thomas in his opinion, but it 
was addressed by the petitioner Quanta in its brief. There, Quanta took the 
position that the inability to show an antitrust violation did nothing to limit the 
scope of the exhaustion doctrine.184 Taking a leaf from Julie Cohen and Mark 
Lemley, Quanta argued that although any contract right to sell free and clear is 
subject to disclaimer, the same is not true with the patent exhaustion doctrine 
which “stems from inherent limits on the grant of the patent right,” and not on 
the shared expectations of the parties to the transaction.185 Missing of course is 
any explanation as to why the contract principles should not override this 
“inherent” doctrine and allow the patent infringement suit to be brought against 
the subsequent taker.  
To add to the confusion, Justice Thomas in Quanta noted that his opinion 
did not express any opinion on the validity of any breach-of-contract claim that 
LGE might have included in its suit against Quanta.186 Yet that suggestion 
opens only more uncertainty. It is highly unlikely that LGE had entered into 
any direct contract with Quanta, given that the sale was by a third party. So the 
remaining question is whether it could claim to be a third-party beneficiary of 
any contract between Intel and Quanta, assuming that the Intel-Quanta deal 
included such a provision. But that claim is surely weaker than the patent 
claim. For one thing, the contract claim does not give rise to a federal cause of 
action, and for another, it is subject to any standard defenses that could be 
raised in ordinary contract actions.  
More to the point, if any such contract were valid, why not allow the 
agreement between Intel and Quanta to waive the patent exhaustion rule for 
sensible business reasons? In Quanta, for example, it makes perfectly good 
business sense that settlements between the parties not increase or decrease 
rights against third persons. Indeed, in this context, there is a simple 
explanation for the notice provision that does not depend on any sophisticated 
account of price discrimination. The notice function allowed for the integration 
of various LCE licenses. More concretely, it seems as though some parties who 
acquired chips from Intel had already obtained a blanket license from LCE for 
its embedded technology.
187
 That notice provision assured these parties that 
 
184. Brief for Petitioners at 30-33, Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 
2109 (2008) (No. 06-937). 
185. Id. at 26 (quoting Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and 
Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (2001)). 
186. 128 S. Ct. at 2122 n.7. 
187. Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, The Federal Circuit’s Licensing Law Jurisprudence: 
Its Nature and Influence, 84 WASH. L. REV. 199, 233 (2009) (noting that the exception in the 
Intel license “is good news for computer-system manufacturers who have a patent portfolio 
cross license with LG Electronics. These companies already paid for the patent rights. They 
 510 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:455 
 
 
they would not be required to pay a second time for a license that they had 
already acquired. That notice provision would also warn other parties that an 
additional payment was required. Prior to purchase, therefore, they could make 
inquiries to LCE for its license rate to make sure that they were satisfied with 
the total license fee paid. The efficiency rationale of this two-part payment 
system seems too evident to question.  
None of this business context was reflected in Justice Thomas‟s opinion in 
Quanta, which was a pure exercise in idle formalism. At no point does it 
indicate why contract principles should not control in light of the sensible 
restrictions of antitrust policy. Indeed the word “default” never appeared in his 
opinion (or for that matter in the Petitioner‟s Brief), even though many of the 
earlier cases that involved the patent exhaustion doctrine were rife with 
antitrust concerns.  
By way of example, United States v. Univis Lens Co.188 discussed the 
patent exhaustion doctrine in connection with the government‟s claim for 
illegal resale price maintenance under the antitrust laws, which at that time was 
a per se offense,189 but is now governed by a rule of reason standard.190 It is 
notable that the gist of Univis‟ case was whether the patent somehow 
immunized Univis from the application of the antitrust law, to which the 
answer should of course be no. At no point, however, did Justice Thomas‟s 
opinion in Quanta so much as address whether the patent exhaustion doctrine 
should be treated as a default rule of contract, subject to variation by contrary 
agreement except when it flouts the antitrust laws. Those points were explicitly 
raised, moreover, in the amicus curiae brief authored by Scott Kieff, Troy 
Paredes and Polk Wagner,191 which I happily signed. 
The overall picture is not pretty. The restrictions on alienation have 
profound influence on the ability to commercialize products. Yet the 
willingness to impose these restraints rests not on careful analysis of these 
consequences, but instead on a set of arid technicalities of no particular value. 
 
do not want to pay again as part of the price of Intel‟s microprocessors. For those 
manufacturers who do not have such a license, however, Intel cannot serve as a “reseller” of 
LG Electronics‟ patent rights. These manufacturers must purchase their patent rights directly 
from the patentee, LG Electronics”). My thanks to Rochelle Dreyfus for pointing out this 
article, which fills a big hole in the business back story of the case.  
188. 316 U.S. 241 (1942). Note that the result in Univis does not survive the addition 
of 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006), sharply limiting the situations in which the patent abuse 
doctrine supplies an affirmative defense against actions for patent infringement or 
contributory infringement. 
189. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
190. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882 (2007).  
191. Brief of Various Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6, 
Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937) (citing case law treating the exhaustion rule as a 
default provision); id. at 9 (raising the antitrust concern). 
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The irony at this juncture is palpable. The attack on the classical liberal 
conception of property rests on the notion that it suffers from excessive 
formality, which drives today‟s strict rules on exhaustion and first sale. 
Everyone concedes that the creation of intellectual property has at its root 
explicit utilitarian justifications.  
Yet the concrete cases fail to link up to any body of law that seeks to 
respond to these issues. As Kieff and Paredes rightly point out, this willingness 
to go it alone does not necessarily result in either stronger or weaker 
intellectual property protection.192 The government should have prevailed in 
Univis, for example, if resale price maintenance was a per se offense under the 
antitrust law, but otherwise should be forced to build up its case under the rule 
of reason. It would be odd to allow the patent law to go its separate way now 
that the antitrust law has concluded that mere possession of a patent does not 
create any conclusive presumption of market power.193 Yet the Court in 
Quanta did not show the slightest awareness that its dubious use of the patent 
exhaustion doctrine went a long way to reinstitute the discredited per se rule 
against tie-ins of International Salt.194 When combined with the eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C.195 decision on injunctive relief, these decisions on first 
sale and patent exhaustion show unmistakably that the rights of exclusion and 
disposition are under sustained attack in the world of intellectual property. 
Never have the classical liberal rules on those topics looked so good. The only 
systematic deviation in patents and copyrights from the rules governing land 
and chattels concerns the issue of duration.  
4. Rights of action  
Another variation on the basic problem of alienation is directed not to the 
sale of the patent or copyright, but to the alienation of a right of action against 
any infringer. These cases raise additional complications that are not present in 
the sale or license area of intellectual property. As before, the initial premise 
remains: the division of the property interest does not impose any additional 
obligations on strangers. Their obligation is still limited to forbear from use, 
which they can satisfy whether the patent or copyright resides in one party or is 
divided among a thousand. Indeed, in these situations, divided interests could 
improve the position of the infringer given that the holders of the individual 
pieces usually do not have large enough stakes to maintain any action. 
Knowing this in advance, the interest holders can designate one of their number 
 
192. Id. at 14. 
193. See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006). 
194. 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
195. 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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as the lead plaintiff in any future lawsuit in order to consolidate those claims, 
which leaves the position of the outsider relatively unchanged.  
Yet here we run into two related questions. The first is whether the right of 
action may be separated from the ownership of the underlying patent. The 
second is whether the right of action against infringers can be divided among 
various persons. On these key matters the patent law again contains puzzling 
doctrines that purport to flow from the inherent nature of the patent grant, but 
which once again are in tension with the basic rules on alienation outlined 
above.  
Once again the analogy to other forms of property is instructive. Judges 
have long been worried about the alienation of claims against specific persons, 
whether it be for the collection of a debt or the enforcement of a contract, 
including of course various kinds of licensing agreements. In these 
circumstances, the assignment or fractionalization of interests could increase 
the burden on the obligor, which is what happens, for example, with the 
assignment of part of a debt.196 One application of this principle asks whether 
individuals to various sale and licensing agreements are entitled to assign the 
right to sue for breach of obligation while retaining all other interests. This 
question commonly arises in connection with the alienation of tort claims, 
where the contingent fee should be understood as a partial alienation of claim 
to the lawyer who takes over its prosecution.197 But in principle there should be 
no opposition to selling the entire tort claim to third persons, either before or 
after it matures.198 (Selling it to the potential defendant in a tort action is just a 
variation on the old theme of assumption of risk.)  
Nonetheless there is resistance to this contractual approach in patent law. 
One instructive decision is Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine 
Works,199 which found it incompatible with patent law to allow the patent 
holder to sever the right to sue an infringer from the other rights in the bundle. 
“[T]he plaintiff in an action [for infringement] must be the person or persons in 
whom the legal title to the patent resided at the time of the infringement.”200 
The question here is why. To be sure, the patentee will usually be the party who 
 
196. Consider the protection provided for the obligor in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 326(2) (1981) (“[N]o legal proceeding can be maintained by the assignor or 
assignee against the obligor over his objection, unless all the persons entitled to the promised 
performance are joined in the proceeding . . . .”). 
197. On the relationship, see generally James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, 
Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Information in Attorney 
Compensation, 9 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349 (1993).  
198. Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 
329 (1987). 
199. 261 U.S. 24 (1923). 
200. Id. at 40. 
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will want to retain the right to sue, since he is the party that loses from any act 
of infringement. But suppose, as in Crown Die, the explicit agreement states 
that the assignor shall receive for valuable consideration the right to sue a given 
defendant for its infringement. The Supreme Court, through Justice Taft, 
nonetheless invalidated the assignment on the ground that the right to exclude 
(which was created by the patent statutes) could not be separated from the 
related common law rights to “make, use, and vend” the objects in question.201 
But even if we assume that the usual patent rights are an amalgam of common 
law and statutory elements, why does the assignment offend? The only 
functional explanation that is offered is one that looks to the increased burdens 
on third parties, which arise when  
the right to make, use and vend, but gives to many different individuals the 
right to sue certain named infringers, respectively, and that with the sole 
motive of harassing them such as is avowed in the recitals of the instrument 
before us. If held legal, it would give the patentee an opportunity without 
expense to himself to stir up litigation by third persons that is certainly 
contrary to the purpose and spirit of the statutory provisions for the assigning 
of patents.
202
  
That result would be correct if multiple parties received the right to sue the 
same defendant for multiple breaches, but in this case the assignment from the 
original holder of the patent only allowed one party to maintain all claims 
under this patent against this defendant, effectively negating the risk of 
duplicative litigation. The reason for the assignment seems to be that the 
assignee of the individual claim was a cheaper enforcer of the patent right in 
question, so that the entire assignment should be welcomed on the ground that 
it reduces the likelihood of infringement in the first place. No one has a 
constitutional right to be immune from valid suit because the wrong party holds 
the claim. We allow generally for class actions to amalgamate small claims that 
would otherwise not be brought, and we allow people to sell liquidated claims 
against third persons. Accordingly, there seems no reason why that same rule 
should not apply to unliquidated claims so long as the assignee of the entire 
claim is bound by the same constraints, and subject to the same defenses, as the 
original holder. 
Despite its uneasy origins the rule in Crown Die has been applied to other 
cases which raise similar concerns. One standard question in this area is 
whether the holder of a nonexclusive license is entitled to maintain a suit for 
patent infringement. Here the parallel question for real property is whether the 
nonexclusive licensee of real estate is entitled to sue for nuisance, to which the 
 
201. Id. at 39. 
202. Id. 
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general answer is no.203 The explanation is that multiple suits fragment the 
basic claim and thus impose additional burdens on the outsider, at a time when 
the action by either the landowner or occupier is sufficient to deal with the 
issue at hand. A similar rule could easily apply to intellectual property. So long 
as the patent holder maintains the right for suit, there is no need to sort out the 
relative claims of individual licensees to sue. That position is generally 
adopted, but not always for the right reason. Thus in Mars, Inc. v. Coin 
Acceptors, Inc., the court held that a wholly owned subsidiary corporation 
lacked constitutional standing to sue for its losses on a nonexclusive license 
from its parent.204 It could no longer, however, recover a higher measure of lost 
profits given that it had made a nonexclusive license to its wholly owned 
subsidiary.205  
Mars thus turned on the proposition that “[o]nly a patent owner or an 
exclusive licensee can have constitutional standing to bring an infringement 
suit; a non-exclusive licensee does not.”206 The issue here bears an eerie 
similarity to the view that somehow the nonexclusive licensor cannot pursue 
injunctive relief under eBay.
207
 But why the result? As a constitutional matter, 
surely there seems to be some injury in fact to the licensee. That would surely 
be the case if the right of suit were expressly assigned. Why not allow that 
action when it is to the advantage of both the parent and subsidiary, parties that 
did not divide their claims to benefit a third party? It is therefore best to put the 
constitutional question to one side, and instead look to how the issue should be 
approached as a matter of general theory. In these cases, the nuisance argument 
works well so long as the patent holder could obtain the full damages for the 
loss, just as if the license had never been issued. The suit by a single party 
would simplify matters by preventing multiple suits by each nonexclusive 
licensee. That result makes good sense; for if the nonexclusive licensee could 
not complain if the patentee issued more licensees, then, as a first 
approximation, it could not complain if the patentee allowed certain claims to 
slide by.  
But the next step in the argument is what should happen if the patentee 
purports to vest its right of suit in one or all of its nonexclusive licensees. Here 
the only legitimate concern is the duplication of claims, which is avoided when 
the nonexclusive licensee becomes the sole representative, endowed with all 
the rights of the patentee. As with Crown Die,208 no infringer should be able to 
 
203. See, e.g., Malone v. Laskey, [1907] 2 K.B. 141, 153-54.  
204. 527 F.3d 1359, 1367-72 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
205. Id. at 1365-67. 
206. Id. at 1367. 
207. See discussion supra pp. 139-139.  
208. 261 U.S. 24 (1923). 
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complain when the task of patent enforcement is placed in private hands, so 
long as only one party is entitled to press all claims arising from the patent 
against the infringer. In this case the situation is even more dramatic because 
the only interested parties were the parent and the subsidiary so that any 
allocation of right between them is at most a bookkeeping convenience, not a 
transfer of any economic interest.  
At this point, the central proposition kicks in: the rights of a patentee 
should be neither diluted nor enhanced by issuing a nonexclusive license to its 
wholly-owned subsidiary. If the patent had been retained by the parent in full, it 
could have had the higher amount of reasonable royalties or lost profits. The 
transfer of its interest to a wholly-owned subsidiary—or indeed to any 
licensee—should not result in the windfall to a stranger to the agreement, 
which is what this decision creates in the infringer. A simple procedure that 
joins all potential claimants in one proceeding should be sufficient to avoid the 
risk of duplicative or inconsistent claims. The rule that nonexclusive licensees 
cannot sue is a good default approximation, but it should be one that the parties 
to the licensee agreement can override so long as the ultimate assignment of the 
cause of action does not lead to duplicative or inconsistent claims.  
D. Takings Questions  
The third area in which to explore the integration of real and intellectual 
property deals with the law of takings, and in particular the role of the critical 
Penn Central209 decision. In the real property cases, the Supreme Court has 
drawn (but not well defended) the strong line between the physical taking—
involving the occupation of private property by the state—and the “mere” 
regulation of that property—just limiting its use and disposition.  
That distinction, however, makes no sense to a traditional private lawyer 
who thinks that all incidents of ownership are of equal dignity, so that all 
servitudes are properly treated as property interests. If a neighbor cannot 
impose a limitation on use or development by an owner without paying for it, 
neither can the government. Yet ironically, the difference between easements 
(which are treated as possessory takings subject to a per se rule)210 and 
restrictive covenants (which are subject to the balancing tests of Penn Central) 
goes against the unification of these two areas that is the centerpiece of the 
recent Restatement on Servitudes.211 Under that unified theory, the only 
difference between the public and the private parties is that the state can force 
the owner to surrender that servitude which the ordinary individual must 
 
209. 438 U.S. 104 (1978), discussed supra in text accompanying notes 65-71. 
210. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm‟n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
211. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.1(2) (2000). 
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purchase in a voluntary transaction. Stated in its simplest form, the function of 
the Takings Clause212 is to allow the government to overcome the holdout 
problem in assembling property for public use; it is not to allow the state to 
acquire property for free. On this view, the right approach to takings always 
starts with the proposition that the government has to pay for what it has taken, 
no matter how much it has left behind. At this point the only tricky questions 
are those of valuation, whereby it can be asked whether the taking of one 
portion of the land increases or diminishes the value of the portion that the 
original owner has retained. 
Unfortunately, the incoherence introduced by the law of regulatory takings 
has scarred intellectual property law. The first line of argument is that no per se 
rule can apply to takings of intellectual property because these interests, by 
definition, cannot be reduced to possession. But that position misses the 
obvious analogical extension. Within the current legal framework, any action 
that allows the government to use, or to authorize private persons to use, 
someone else‟s patent or copyright should be subject, right now, to the per se 
takings rules.213 To be sure, this opens up the government to serious valuation 
issues, but these are not any more complicated than the issues that arise in the 
condemnation of such complex issues as utility easements and power lines in 
both rural and urban settings. And in most cases, there is no reason to take the 
patent in the first place, as the voluntary licensing market works well, and there 
are no nuisance-like externalities that might justify limiting a patent use. 
Speaking generally, the dynamism of intellectual property markets tends to 
shorten the period of any economic monopoly by allowing the entry of new 
products into the market on ever shorter cycles, which is indeed the case.214  
I believe that the full takings apparatus should apply to intellectual 
property as it does to physical property. But even if that position is not adopted, 
it seems clear that the current Penn Central rules should be limited to cases in 
which the government restricts the use of the patent or copyright, at least where 
there is no concern with cartelization or monopolization. It has no application 
in cases where the government uses the patent itself or authorizes its use by 
other private individuals. The use of a patent is, in a word, no different from the 
use of land. 
The permissive attitude of the Penn Central case, when coupled with the 
 
212. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
213. For a development of this theme, see Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional 
Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57 (2004). 
214. Thirty-three years passed before a new entrant challenged the Edison phonograph. 
Only three years passed before the first competitor entered the new compact disc market in 
the 1980s. Rajshree Agarwal & Michael Gort, First-Mover Advantage and the Speed of 
Competitive Entry, 1887-1986, 44 J.L. & ECON. 161, 161 (2001).  
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skeptical attitude toward intellectual property in general, can lead to destructive 
political dynamics in cases of simple expropriation. Recently, I wrote two 
lengthy letters215 to Senators Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter, then Chairman 
and Ranking Member, respectively, of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
on behalf of DataTreasury Inc.216 in opposition to Section 14 of the now-
defunct Patent Reform Act of 2007217 and its successor, the Patent Reform Act 
of 2008218 (which should remain defunct for many different reasons).  
The key text reads as follows: 
Section 287(d)(1) With respect to the use by a financial institution of a check 
collection system that constitutes an infringement under subsection (a) or (b) 
of section 271, the provisions of sections 281, 283, 284, and 285 shall not 
apply against the financial institution with respect to such a check collection 
system.
219
  
A bit of explanation is necessary to clarify the underlying issues. The only 
patents to which this section could have applied were DataTreasury‟s U.S. 
Patent No. 5,910,988 (filed Aug. 27, 1997) (“the ‟988 patent”) and U.S. Patent 
No. 6,032,137 (filed May 19, 1998) (“the ‟137 patent”), which discuss the 
creation of a system that utilizes machinery to electronically capture “paper 
transactions from documents and receipts” as electronic images. Put more 
commonly, the patents cover the technology that is used for the remote imaging 
of check and credit receipts. Multiple judicial challenges to the two patents 
proved fruitless,220 and the legislation in question was not drafted to contest the 
validity of the patents, which was why it covered any case of “infringement.” It 
was also introduced to make sure that remedies for damages, injunctions, and 
legal fees could not be recovered for any such infringement.  
The 2008 version of the bill went one step better, for it created an 
exception to this rule of non-enforcement on behalf of financial institutions, 
which could sue if anyone violated one of their patents to a check collection 
system.221 And for good measure, it added a further provision, which prevented 
 
215. Letter from author to Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary, and Senator Arlen Specter, Ranking Minority Member, Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary (Oct. 29, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from author to Senator Patrick Leahy, 
Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and Senator Arlen Specter, Ranking Minority 
Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (Apr. 2, 2008) (on file with author).  
216. DataTreasury, Inc., http://www.datatreasury.com (last visited Aug. 29, 2009). 
217. Patent Reform Act, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 14 (2007).  
218. Patent Reform Act, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 13 (2008). 
219. Id. 
220. DataTreasury Corp. v. Ingenico S.A., No. 5:02CV95, No. 5:02CV124, No. 
5:03CV39, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15782 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2005) (deciding three cases).  
221. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 13(a), which reads: 
This subsection shall not limit or affect the enforcement rights of the original owner of a 
patent where such original owner— 
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the application of this last exception for any company that transferred its 
patents to a financial institution in order to escape the basic statutory 
prohibition.222  
There is no need to dwell on the ad hoc favoritism embodied in these 
provisions. But what is critical is that the entire scheme rests on the assumption 
that financial institutions can use the patented technology free of any and all 
legal restraints. Even under the restricted rules of the current legal framework, 
the only way to avoid the per se takings rule is to make the unsound argument 
that per se rules are impossible for intangible assets. 
That proposition is, however, far from clear even under the current law. 
Nonetheless, Walter Dellinger and Christopher Schroeder, Professors at Duke 
University School of Law, wrote to Senators Patrick Leahy and Arlen Specter 
on behalf of their unnamed clients on O‟Melveny & Myers firm stationery223 
an elaborate defense of Section 14 of the Patent Reform Act of 2007. I shall 
comment here only on their effort to justify this wholesale excision of patent 
protection on the strength of Penn Central.  
The gist of their argument (which was wrong on the facts) relied on the 
claim that the patent in question only referenced documents, without explicitly 
referring to checks. Accordingly, under the “investment backed expectations” 
test of Penn Central, the patentee could be stripped of this particular right 
because it had no specific intention to apply its patent to this set of end uses.224 
It is important to quote the key paragraph in their argument: 
The most basic reason for which we write is to rebut the initial suggestion that 
the Check 21 Amendment violates the Constitution. To allege a taking here is 
essentially to claim a constitutional right to whatever windfall profits may 
 
(A) is directly engaged in the commercial manufacture and distribution of machinery or the 
commercial development of software; and  
(B) has operated as a subsidiary of a bank holding company, as such term is defined under 
section 2(a) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841(a)), prior to July 19, 
2007.  
222. “A party shall not manipulate its activities, or conspire with others to manipulate 
its activities, for purposes of establishing compliance with the requirements of this 
subsection, including, without limitation, by granting or conveying any rights in the patent, 
enforcement of the patent, or the result of any such enforcement.” Id. § 13(d)(4). 
223. Letter from Walter Dellinger, Professor, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, and Christopher 
Schroeder, Professor, Duke Univ. Sch. of Law, to Senator Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary, and Senator Arlen Specter, Ranking Minority Member, Senate 
Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 6, 2008) (on file with author) [hereinafter Dellinger & 
Schroeder Letter]. 
224. Among the claims made were: “a method for central management, storage and 
verification of remotely captured paper transactions from documents and receipts” (Claim 26 
of the ‟988 patent); “a method for central management, storage and verification of remotely 
captured paper transactions from checks” (Claim 26, ‟137 patent); “capturing an image . . . 
and extracting data therefrom” (Claim 46, ‟988 patent). Documents include checks as a 
matter of ordinary usage, and checks were in any event explicitly covered.  
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come a patent holder‟s way during the life of its patents, regardless of the 
public interest. If that were enough for a taking, it would confer on patents a 
status unknown to all other kinds of property, all of which are held subject to 
the possibility of reasonable regulation. After the Check 21 Amendment 
becomes law, affected patent holders will still have intact the ability to receive 
valuable and reasonable commercial gains from their patents, as evidenced by 
the fact that licenses have already been entered into with several companies. 
That is more than sufficient to satisfy their legitimate expectation.
225  
Their letter thus makes an ill-designed appeal to a set of integrated rules for 
all forms of property, after which it refers explicitly to the tripartite test in Penn 
Central.226 As might be expected, Dellinger and Schroeder do not write in a 
vacuum, for much of the critical writing on intellectual property has used just 
this framework to bolster its claims. Thus, Sara K. Stadler has recently written 
about the incentive-expectation circularity that exists in copyright law.227 Her 
effort is to expose the confusion in the traditional economic arguments that 
copyrights are justified in order to promote the various arts. Her point is that if 
in a particular case the copyright holder has no expectation of a particular form 
of development, it cannot serve as an inducement for production, and thus is 
deserving of no protection at all.  
That position has been elaborated in a recent article in the Harvard Law 
Review by Shyamkrishna Balganesh,228 who takes his cue from the 
foreseeability limitation on tort liability in negligence cases. The implicit, if 
much disputed,229 premise is that the tort law does not hold individuals 
responsible for unforeseeable consequences of their original negligence, 
because unavailable information does not allow parties to respond to incentives 
to avoid loss. By parallel reasoning, they do not respond to unforeseeable gains 
 
225. Dellinger & Schroeder Letter, supra note 223, at 2. 
226. See id. at 3. 
227. Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Expectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433 
(2007). 
228. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 1569 (2009). 
229. Many cases prefer to use a directness test for the consequences of particular 
actions. See, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964); Christianson v. 
Chi., St. P., M. & O. Ry., 69 N.W. 640 (Minn. 1896); In re Polemis & Furness, Withy & 
Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560. The leading authority the other way is still Overseas Tankship 
(U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng’g Co. (Wagon Mound I), [1961] A.C. 388 (P.C.) (appeal 
taken from Austl.). Academic response is divided. Compare Glanville Williams, The Risk 
Principle, 77 L. Q. R. 179 (1961) (looking to what risks the actor should have foreseen), with 
Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 333 
(2002) (advancing that a harm-within-the-risk analysis is descriptively inaccurate and 
normatively undesirable). My sympathies are strongly with the directness principle, at least 
in stranger cases, which comports much better with a general system of strict liability that I 
have long supported. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 
151 (1973). 
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in the law of copyright in the creation of their writings and should not therefore 
receive protection for their “windfall” gains.  
Beware! The use of the term “windfall” in property should immediately 
excite suspicion. Its literal definition is something that “falls” to a person by 
virtue of the “wind,” like fruit from a wild tree. The point is that windfall gains 
are those that no individual did anything to either create or preserve. In these 
situations, it is exceedingly difficult to fix on any strong rule for one who owns 
the gains so generated. Nothing suggests that it is possible to incentivize 
individuals to engage in productive activities for these windfall profits. It is 
therefore no surprise that the decided cases often struggle over such questions 
as to whether the windfall belongs to the person who stumbles upon it, or to the 
person on whose property it was found, with inconclusive results.230  
Alternatively, its broader definition refers to any unearned gain by some 
unexpected good fortune. In the usual case, those gains go to the owner of the 
property whose value has been increased, usually on the theory that the owner 
also takes the risk of unexpected losses attributable to acts of God, the inverse 
of the windfall gain. In any event, the whole point of using the term “windfall” 
to describe the accretion in value to a new technology is to make it appear as 
though it were wholly undeserved. But it hardly follows that the unanticipated 
gains fall into the public domain, when they could follow the usual rule and 
accrue to the owner. In any event, once the owner is aware of the prospect of 
copyright gains from future technologies that are as yet unknown, he will 
increase his efforts to produce those gains—which he will not do if the law 
assigns them to others. The ill-fated history of the Windfall Profits Tax on oil 
should be warning enough against the new use of the term.231 
Given its general appeal, however, it is no accident that the constitutional 
arguments of Dellinger and Schroeder track the same faulty language taken 
 
230. Compare Bridges v. Hawkesworth, (1851) 21 L.J.Q.B. 75 (preferring the finder of 
money over the owner of the shop in which it was found), and Hannah v. Peel, [1945] K.B. 
509 (preferring finder of brooch to owner of a house leased to military), with Elwes v. Brigg 
Gas Co., (1886) 33 Ch.D. 562 (preferring owner of land to finder of prehistoric boat 
embedded in the soil). 
231. Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980) 
(repealed 1988). The Act was structured as a three-tiered excise tax that exempted some oil 
production in Alaska, prompting a constitutional challenge under the Uniformity Clause, 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution. See United States v. Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74 
(1983) (upholding the exemption since it was not “drawn on state political lines,” and 
instead reflects “unique climatic and geographic conditions”). The Act was an attempt to 
capture and redistribute the increased revenues expected from the decontrol of crude oil 
prices. By the time it was repealed, the Act had led to an increase in dependence on foreign 
oil and was generating little to no revenue; it ultimately attained only twenty percent of its 
initial projections. See SALVATORE LAZZARI, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CRUDE OIL 
WINDFALL PROFIT TAX OF THE 1980S: IMPLICATIONS FOR CURRENT ENERGY POLICY, CRS 
REP. NO. RL33305, at 15 (2006).  
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from the private law context. The first of these arguments has to do with the 
understanding of “reasonable expectations,” which in many cases is open to the 
charge that the account of property rights is perfectly circular.232 It is yet 
another of the many false reasons to explain the supposed demise of the 
classical liberal system. The conceptual problem, we are told, is that reasonable 
expectations determine the appropriate legal rule, but at the same time we know 
that the expectations that people have are determined by the legal rules now in 
place. The expectations that determine the legal rules are thus determined by 
the legal rules that they are supposed to establish. Under that pinched view of 
the world, no person could have a reasonable expectation of privacy against 
private or government snooping because the legal rule could authorize the 
snooping and thus make it unreasonable to expect any other result. The cases 
on privacy in both the tort and criminal procedure contexts reject that 
interpretation.233 A far better test is this: use the notion of reasonable 
expectation to identify that set of rules which optimizes the value of resources 
across individuals.234 Thus in connection with ordinary expectations of privacy, 
eavesdropping in restaurants is not allowed because it is “cheaper” for people 
not to lean over across tables than it is to have them situated far apart. Of 
course, persons can retreat to private rooms for sensitive discussions, but for 
general purposes, the value that all people have in maintaining their freedom of 
action and their security from intrusion is presumptively maximized by 
following this convention. 
This approach removes the supposed circularity with respect to property 
rights. We know to a certainty that all individuals will claim the maximum 
rights which the law will give them. This claim of right is not vacuous given 
such restrictions as the central proposition that no person is entitled to 
copyright or patent a mere idea. The tradeoff is identical to that we observed 
with respect to eavesdropping. Keeping these basic intellectual building blocks 
 
232. See Stadler, supra note 227. For my critique of this notion in connection with 
takings of real property, see Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A 
Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993).  
233. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353-59 (1967) (discussing reasonable 
expectations in the Fourth Amendment context); Roach v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 
1958) (recognizing tort action for invasion of privacy by listening devices). For an 
explanation of how these rules are socially optimal, see Richard A. Epstein, Deconstructing 
Privacy: And Putting it Back Together Again, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL. 1 (2000), and Richard A. 
Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment 
Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003 (2000). 
234. For the dangers of the expectation arguments in tax incremental financing, see 
City of Chicago v. Prologis, 890 N.E.2d 639 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008), cert. granted, 900 N.E.2d 
1116 (Ill. 2008). For my critique, see Richard A. Epstein, How to Undermine Tax Increment 
Financing: The Lessons of ProLogis v. City of Chicago, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010). 
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in social solution produces far greater value than their privatization—unless 
you would like to rent out the right to use the Pythagorean Theorem. But within 
this framework, we want individuals to claim all potential uses that fall within 
the outer boundaries of their patent or copyright, subject to the other limitations 
appropriate to the field. The more that creators can claim within these 
boundaries, the quicker these innovations will be successfully commercialized.  
In connection with the DataTreasury patent, the actual patents referred to 
all documents in one case and to checks in another. But even if checks had not 
been explicitly included, what potential inventor would ever give away uses to 
some unspecified class of documents, say to forms of electronic transfer that 
have yet to be devised? Virtually every contract on that copyright has explicit 
provisions that cover new media, which is a known unknown and not an 
unknown unknown, only the latter of which are the sort that could not influence 
incentives. Allowing legislation to carve out first this and then that exception to 
a valid patent is an invitation to ceaseless politics. And the only way that 
dubious maneuver obtains a patina of respectability is through the sorry state of 
the Penn Central doctrine in its home turf of real estate transactions. And so it 
is that the same doctrines that infect the law of takings for tangible objects 
work their same untoward influence into the world of intellectual property. 
CONCLUSION  
This Article has examined at great length one of the fundamental questions 
of property law: to what extent does a unified set of principles apply to both 
physical and intellectual property? I have written this Article in order to rebut 
the all too common claim that the current system is in a state of massive 
intellectual disarray that heralds its incipient demise. But this diagnosis is 
faulty, for virtually all of the current malaise in dealing with both tangible and 
intellectual property stems from the failure to keep to the coherent rules of 
acquisition, exclusion, alienation, regulation, and condemnation that are called 
for by the classical liberal system that always seeks to find a middle way 
between the unduly robust property rights of a pure libertarian system that does 
not easily accommodate antitrust, eminent domain, or taxation, and a gloppy 
communitarian system that robs property rights of their most durable and 
desirable social properties.  
Contrary to the doomsayers, any system of tangible and intangible property 
rights that hews to classical liberal conceptions runs no risk of collapse or 
disintegration. Rather, the proper understanding of these two systems and their 
interconnections start from a common aspiration—to figure out a system of 
rights allocation to maximize the overall value of assets held in private hands. 
Historically, the rules for physical property evolved earlier, and typically in 
response to technological change. There was no permanent occupancy of land 
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until agriculture became viable, for example. But it is clear that both systems 
draw nourishment from the classical liberal account of property that gives to 
the owner of anything tangible the exclusive rights of possession, use and 
disposition. These rights are typically of infinite time horizon for tangibles, but 
of limited time horizon for patents and copyrights for the reason stated above. 
In working out both systems, it is important to be aware that the so-called 
“formal” rules of property law have strong functional justifications, deriving 
from the simple maxim, “coercion no, cooperation yes,” which cautions against 
the use of forced transactions in both areas. Only a system of definite rights that 
are neither increased nor decreased through voluntary transfers can achieve that 
end. The strongest elements of the legal system are those which adhere to that 
simple maxim in all areas. Unfortunately, modern academic thought all too 
often seeks to deconstruct the rules for tangible property, rendering the field 
more opaque and less coherent than it should be. That similar confusion easily 
carries over into patents and copyrights, where modern decisions work to 
undermine the rights of exclusion and disposition so essential to the private 
law, and to undercut the protection of private property against government 
regulation.  
None of these developments are dictated by either economic theory or 
modern social circumstances. All too often the defenders of the modern rules 
are guilty of this intellectual lapse. There is a lesson that we should learn about 
charges of conceptualism and formalism. Often, these roll easily off the tongue. 
But before these criticisms are accepted, it always has to be asked whether 
formal rules have a functional justification. Fortunately, in many cases, these 
do. By setting out clear boundary lines between parties they allow individuals 
to organize their affairs with greater clarity than is possible under “pragmatic” 
legal regimes, whose multi-factor tests often add unneeded uncertainty in the 
articulation of legal rules. The stakes of getting the right analytical approach 
are real. To confuse the voluntary division of property with the disintegration 
of property is to make a deep conceptual error that any well-ordered legal 
system should strive mightily to avoid. So long as we understand how all the 
pieces in this complex system work together, we can dismiss as premature any 
obituary for the classical conception of property rights. 
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